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ABSTRACT 
One of the great puzzles of vision science is how, over the course of development, the complex 
visual array comprising many regions of different colors and luminances is transformed into a 
sophisticated and meaningful constellation of objects. Gestaltists describe some of the rules that 
seem to govern a mature parsing of the visual scene, but where do these rules come from? Are they 
innate—endowed by evolution, or do they come somehow from visual experience? The answer to 
this question is usually confounded in infant studies as the timelines of maturation and experience 
are inextricably linked. Here, we describe studies with a special population of late-onset vision 
patients, which suggest a distinction between those capabilities available innately and those which 
are crafted via learning from the visual environment. We conclude with a hypothesis, based on 
these findings and other evidence, that early-available common fate motion cues provide a level of 
perceptual organization which forms the basis for the learning of subsequent cues. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction  
 
Vision – the ability to “see”—seems so natural and seamless to us that a casual student of the mind 
may not even consider this faculty as requiring study. The lay observer often considers the eye as 
the source of vision, matching its processed images to memories in the brain. Vision is considered 
the domain of optometrists and ophthalmologists, not of psychologists and neuroscientists.  If 
further thought is given, the role of the brain in this conceptualization is deemed to be that of a 
“matchmaker” between the output of the eye and the stored visual memories and their semantic 
tags: Vision is little more than an output of color values and their locations. 
The more informed or thoughtful observer realizes that vision is tremendously more complex than 
mapping points of light to stored memories of these points. One must infer the structure of a 3-
dimensional world from a 2D projection, a process far beyond simple “matching.” Objects, textures, 
and faces can be viewed from an infinite number of perspectives under wildly varying conditions of 
illumination and occlusion. It is the role of the brain to solve this incredibly difficult problem of 
“parsing” an image into interpretable real-world “stuff”. 
The Gestaltist tradition in vision science (Wertheimer, 1923) inspired a search for “rules” that 
might govern this visual parsing. Kanizsa (1979) catalogued a large number of conditions and  
“cues” (e.g., symmetry, regularity, continuity; and more notably, when these cues fail as well) from 
this research that seem to serve to disambiguate objects from background and from other objects, 
but he recognized that even this substantial list was plagued with myriad exceptions and could only 
explain a subset of the stimuli that normal adults easily decompose into accurate interpretations.  
One of the most important conceptual frameworks of the computational problem involved in the 
parsing of the visual world was given by Marr (1982). This treatise highlights the complexity of 
visual parsing from the point of view of the algorithms and calculations that such a system must in 
some form implement. Marr decomposed the process into three stages: the primal sketch, 
identifying properties of the image such as edges and regions; the 2.5D sketch, interpreting viewer-
center aspects of the scene such as surface geometry; and the 3D model, providing a full 
reconstruction of the objects independent of viewpoint. Although the details and validity of this 
model are debated, it serves the invaluable purpose of providing at least one concrete perspective 
on the problems that need to be solved by the brain in order to process an image into a model of the 
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physical world. It is this process that forms the foundation of what we generally think of as “vision”, 
as opposed to the optical properties of the eye. 
Given the complexity of vision, the relative ease of our visual parsing accomplishments, and the 
observation that even infants seem to have this ability, it is tempting to conclude that evolution has 
endowed us with this ability, just as it has formed the eye that provides us with optical input. In this 
view, infants are either born with a genetically pre-programmed ability to interpret visual scenes 
into 3D scenes, or their brains mature over a short period of time, allowing this ability to emerge in 
a structured manner. Although it may not be obvious to the parent trying to differentiate between 
these two views merely by observation--since general intelligence, motor skills, and other abilities 
are developing simultaneously—infant vision (both in terms of acuity and the ability to parse the 
visual scene) is not equivalent to its adult counterpart, and we discuss the differences below. This 
negates the hypothesis that vision is immediately available in its full adult form. However, the 
“maturation” hypothesis—i.e., that visual skills develop as the brain matures through a genetic 
program— is a viable one. 
The alternative viewpoint to visual development is that experience with the visual and physical 
world allows an infant to “learn” visual abilities. Although not as intuitive with respect to our 
personal experiences as the genetically-endowed version of events, there is ample evidence that at 
least some visual learning occurs later in life solely from experience with the visual environment, 
including, as mere examples, the increased ability to detect the motion of random dots in a 
particular direction on which the observer has been trained (Ball & Sekuler, 1987) and the parsing 
of object contours that were invisible prior to exposure to the ground-truth object concept (e.g., the 
Dalmatian dog illusion, to be discussed later (Gregory, 1970)) . Thus, there is evidence that the 
brain is “plastic” or changeable into adulthood even when it comes to visual processing, though we 
have not yet shown to what extent this plasticity applies to the general “rules” of vision, such as 
those mentioned earlier.  
This question of whether visual perception is learned or innate is the subject of endless debate and 
has rich historical roots dating back to at least the late 17th century when the distinction between 
nativism and empiricism was sharply highlighted in the works of philosophers like Locke, Berkeley 
and Hume. 
The answer to the question of the origins of visual processing will likely not be a simple one. Vision 
encompasses a number of complex processes, and some of these processes may be completely 
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genetically pre-determined (i.e,. innate), others may involve an interaction between innate and 
experiential factors, and yet others may be almost entirely a result of learning from the 
environment. It is the goal of this chapter to differentiate among these processes and to summarize 
the evidence for their provenance; it is the goal of this thesis to provide novel evidence that parsing 
abilities may be more dependent on learning than is usually presumed and to outline a possible 
method for bootstrapping this learning. 
 
1.1  “Maturation” versus “development” 
Although the words “maturation” and “development” are often used interchangeably, here we must 
adopt a more precise usage in order to make subtle but important distinctions in our discussion of 
vision acquisition. Both words, in the context of neuroscience, usually refer to the changes that 
occur from birth to adulthood, during which time physiology (including neurophysiology) and 
cognitive abilities are progressing towards an adult state. We refer to this multi-faceted progression 
generally as “development.” We refer to the physiological and anatomical changes that occur 
specifically in the brain and in the rest of the body as “maturation.” Thus, maturation is a subset of 
development.  
To illustrate, let us consider the “development” of walking. An infant must practice the use of its 
limbs repeatedly before mastering this skill. This occurs through learning and is accelerated 
through repetition (P. R. Zelazo, N. A. Zelazo, & Kolb, 1972). However, walking is also dependent on 
maturation – the muscles of the legs and torso must be sufficiently strong to support the infant. 
Although these muscles also get stronger through use, in these early stages general growth is 
required first, and this growth of course is genetically preordained. Physical growth (muscle mass 
and leg size), a function primarily of maturation, plays a role in the enablement of learned 
processes in walking dynamics (Thelen, Fisher, & Ridley-Johnson, 1984), and thus both 
mechanisms contribute to general walking development. 
Maturation is the product primarily of genetic programming (i.e., intrinsic factors), whereas 
development is the product of both maturational processes as well as any changes that occur 
through practice, learning, or environmental interaction (extrinsic factors). That is not to say that 
maturation is completely independent of experience. Our muscles generally become stronger as we 
progress through adolescence due to the maturational process of puberty and general growth, but 
not if they experience prolonged disuse. A similar pattern may be observed in the brain. The 
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development of ocular dominance columns are a characteristic of visual neuroanatomy whose 
beginnings are evident immediately after birth, yet visual deprivation in one eye can have 
permanent deleterious effects on this neuroanatomy (Hubel, Wiesel, & LeVay, 1977; Wiesel & 
Hubel, 1965b), suggesting some role of experience in a process with a maturational origin.  
Another distinction can be provided using a computer metaphor. An electronic device with only 
read-only memory can be thought of as a pure incarnation of a “genetic” (or “innate”) program, 
where all aspects of its behavior are predetermined. The resulting behavior would in this case be 
innate as well. Now consider a device that implements a generic learning algorithm and learns a 
variety of behaviors by extracting information from its sensory environment, the results of which it 
stores in its working memory. In this example, the learning algorithm is “innate,” while the 
behaviors are clearly acquired through learning. Some algorithms may even be able to modify 
themselves, thus making the concept of “innate” less intuitive, as the algorithm that ultimately gives 
rise to the learning of a behavior itself came from a learning process. Finally, consider a system 
somewhere in between these two, in which an innate algorithm implements a behavior, but the 
algorithm requires experience with the environment to set parameters or to calibrate some details 
of its computations. Is the resulting behavior now innate or learned? The answer seems to lie 
somewhere between the two possibilities.  
Thus, we see that this line between maturation and the components of development that are not 
maturational (usually termed “practice” for muscular development and “learning” for neurological 
and cognitive development) is not necessarily a clear one. In one extreme sense, every one of our 
cognitive skills depend on maturation, as they would not exist without a certain pre-wiring that 
enables the acquisition of these skills; in the other extreme, perhaps none of our skills are purely 
maturational, as complete sensory deprivation from birth would likely impede their acquisition as 
well. Perhaps it would be more accurate to discuss a continuum, rather than making a categorical 
distinction, but for simplicity in our discussion of visual development, we will usually employ the 
label “maturation” for processes that are largely determined innately and “learning” for processes 
that are acquired more flexibly and are to a significant extent dependent on experience. 
1.2 A brief history of visual development research 
Research in the field of “visual development” provides us with a robust foundation of prior work on 
which to build. Here, we present some key findings on the progression of visual abilities. We begin 
with a survey of physiological, anatomical and brain imaging studies on brain plasticity. Next, we 
summarize the behavioral literature on visual development. In order to provide some structure, as 
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well as a useful theoretical distinction, the behavioral findings will be divided into two sections: 
“lower-level vision” and “higher-level vision.” Lower-level vision will refer to aspects of vision such 
as acuity, color vision, and stereopsis, while higher-level vision pertains, for example, to the 
extraction of objects from their background, the discovery of surface geometry from a scene, and 
object recognition. (For simplicity, we combine the often used categories of “mid-level” and “high-
level” vision into the higher-level category because, depending on one’s theory of visual acquisition, 
the distinction is not an easy one to make when discussing visual development.)  
1.2.1 Early brain plasticity in vision 
For practical reasons, most studies of brain plasticity at the level of physiology have been 
performed in animals. This is a significant caveat: As Riesen (1947) observed in his observations of 
dark-reared monkeys, the duration of “apprenticeship” of visual experience required for functional 
usage seems to increase at higher phylogenetic levels. For example, dark-reared rats were able to 
make use of visual cues within 15 minutes of sight restoration in their jumping behavior and were 
supposedly indistinguishable from normal rats within two hours (Hebb, 1937); Riesen’s monkeys 
required a minimum of 50 hours prior to observable “visually mediated learning”; human instances 
of early deprivation cataloged in von Senden (1932) “may require an even longer exposure.” 
Although it is questionable how to compare the behavioral tasks, observational methods, and 
deprivation periods involved in these and subsequent studies, the general observation points out 
the importance of testing multiple species along the phylogenetic tree to provide for an 
understanding that is more likely to apply to the human visual system.  
Some of the earliest and most significant studies of brain plasticity in visual cortex were those of 
Hubel, Wiesel and colleagues, who observed newborn kittens and the effects of experimentally-
controlled visual deprivation in kittens and, later, monkeys while simultaneously measuring 
physiological responses from neurons in visual cortex and the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN). In 
newborn kittens with almost no patterned-light experience, it was observed that the physiology of 
primary visual cortex (V1) resembled that of mature kittens with respect to receptive-field 
organization, binocular interaction, and functional architecture (line orientation and motion-
direction selectivity), though the response properties of the cells were somewhat muted (Hubel & 
Wiesel, 1963). The presence of this visual machinery was surprising given that kittens are not able 
to exhibit behavioral usage of vision until perhaps 3 weeks following normal eye-opening.  
Given that no experience with patterned vision was necessary for the early development of these 
cortical response properties, it is presumed that the rudiments of such a structure are innate. Yet, 
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the delayed behavioral usefulness of this structure leaves open the possibility that experience is 
necessary to bring these cells to full maturity or to integrate it into functional vision. In order to 
understand the dynamics of this development, the kittens were deprived of vision in one or both 
eyes so that the changes in cell properties could be monitored during early development. 
Wiesel and Hubel (1963) report that neurons in the LGN, a “conduit” between the optic nerve 
conveying the output of the retina and V1, maintained normal receptive fields despite 3 months of 
visual deprivation in one eye, although “marked” histological changes were observed in cells driven 
by the deprived eye. A very different pattern emerged for neurons in V1 (Wiesel & Hubel, 1965a). 
Monocular deprivation caused an almost complete inability of V1 neurons to be driven by activity 
from the deprived eye. Since experiments with newborn kittens showed that this wiring is indeed 
present from birth, this is evidence of a disruption of normal development, not simply a slowing of 
experience-dependent tuning. Further insight can be gained from the binocularly-deprived kittens. 
Although one might expect that binocular deprivation would cause a wide-scale disruption in the 
neuron response properties (in effect, duplicating the result in the other deprived eye as found for 
the one deprived eye), in fact the opposite occurred: Even without any visual input to either eye, 
over half of cells tested seemed “perfectly normal,” although many other cells did become 
unresponsive.  
The relatively minimal disruption in V1 response properties with binocular, as compared to 
monocular, deprivation seems to indicate that experience per se is not necessary for this level of 
development of cellular responses. Rather, some elements of this development are innate, but there 
is sufficient plasticity to reassign many of these properties. Figure 1.1 illustrates the remarkable 
extent of plasticity of ocular dominance patterns following monocular deprivation in the monkey.  
To further illustrate the extent of plasticity, Movshon (1976) found (in the kitten) that reversing the 
deprivation by suturing shut the previously unaffected eye and opening the deprived eye allowed 
the initially deprived eye to “regain control” of cortical neurons, though this flexibility is greatly 
diminished with maturational age. Recent evidence has shown, however, that in the rat a period of 
total visual deprivation prior to reversal can re-enable juvenile-like ocular dominance plasticity 
(He, Hodos, & Quinlan, 2006). 
11 
 
 
Figure 1.1 The graph on the left shows the normal histogram of ocular dominance properties of cells in V1. The graph on the 
right depicts the resulting pattern of ocular dominance after 18 months of monocular visual deprivation. There is a clear bias 
towards the non-deprived eye, illustrating the marked plasticity of the ocular dominance property of cortical cells. From 
(Hubel et al., 1977). 
More recently, the plasticity of more advanced properties of cortical neurons has been probed. 
Engert and colleagues (2002) examined the response properties of neurons in the tectum (the 
functional analog of visual cortex in mammals) of Xenopus (frog) tadpoles after repetitive visual 
exposure to uni-directional moving bars. Tectal neurons became directionally sensitive to the 
direction of the moving bar as a result of the visual stimulation within minutes, and this selectivity 
persisted up to 50 minutes. 
A more extreme form of plasticity was exhibited in the rewiring of ferret cortex to provide auditory 
sensory input to visual cortex and vice versa. Primary auditory cortex showed evidence of an 
orientation map responding to visual input similar to that found in V1 (though less organized) 
(Sharma, Angelucci, & Sur, 2000). The animals were also able to respond to light “seen” only by the 
auditory cortex as if it were a visual stimulus (von Melchner, Pallas, & Sur, 2000). In the human, 
visual deprivation in the congenitally blind can lead to activation in visual cortical areas driven by 
tactile or auditory stimuli (see (Burton, 2003) for a review), though it is unknown whether this 
activation serves a function or is merely epiphenomenal.  
Taken together, these results suggest that some very elemental properties of the visual system stem 
from an intrinsic program, but that these properties are highly susceptible to experiential 
manipulation and indeed seem very flexible in their fine-grained structure and even perhaps, in the 
case of cortex, their locus. It would be premature, however, to generalize from these results that 
full, functional vision can develop in arbitrary areas of cortex with the right kind of visual 
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stimulation, as the correspondence between these studies and the behavioral ramifications of their 
manipulations has not yet been established.  
1.2.2 Lower-level visual development 
Lower-level vision refers to those processes in the visual system that compute properties of the 
visual image that are not tied to the interpretation of the structure of the physical scene; rather, 
these properties simply reflect local image features. Such properties include acuity, color and 
luminance parsing, local motion extraction and stereopsis. In actuality, the distinction is not always 
clear, as the interpretation of a scene has been argued to affect the perception even of these 
seemingly clear-cut properties (Adelson, 1995; Gilchrist, 2006). In the checkershadow illusion in 
Figure 1.2a, for instance, it is argued that the interpretation of the dark strip as shadow enhances 
the illusion that patch A and patch B are of radically different luminances, whereas in fact they are 
the same. This explanation is dependent on a higher-level processing of the scene, and thus this 
effect would not be considered a pure low-level process. On the other hand, this illusion also exists 
without the use of shadows per se in the form of the simultaneous contrast illusion (Figure 1.2b) 
(Chevreul & Martel, 1860). This version gives rise to a slightly attenuated illusory effect. It is 
possible that the checkershadow illusion is a result of both low-level (simultaneous contrast) and 
higher-level (shadow-related) processes.1 When considering the development of these abilities, it is 
important to differentiate between the processing of, say, luminance based on local properties 
versus the processing of this feature in conjunction with the overall interpretation of the scene. 
These processes may indeed have separate developmental trajectories. Nonetheless, most studies 
of low-level vision present these features to the observer in absence of higher-level confounds, 
allowing for an understanding of low-level visual development in isolation of these other factors.  
                                                             
1 It may also be argued that local properties such as the shadow’s penumbra may interact with the illusion, without 
resorting to a higher-level interpretation of the strip as a shadow, bringing us back to a low-level interpretation for 
the checkershadow illusion. 
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(A) (B)  
Figure 1.2 (A) The checkershadow illusion. Squares A and B have identical luminance, yet their perceived brightness is very 
different. The size of the effect some argue is stronger than would be expected from a difference in local contrast, thus 
pointing out a possible role of the interpretation of shadow (a physical interpretation) in the perception of luminance. This 
explanation blurs the line between low-level and higher-level vision. Figure taken from Adelson (1995). (B) The simultaneous 
contrast illusion illustrates a similar (though attenuated) phenomenon without the use of explicit shadows, highlighting the 
possibility of multiple levels of explanation. 
We begin our historical perspective on low-level vision with acuity – the ability to discern change in 
luminance across large visual angles as well as minute distances. Acuity is of course dependent on 
the quality of the optical image reaching the retina due to the refractive properties and 
transparency of the cornea and lens, the shape of the eye, and other physical attributes of the eye 
itself. It is also dependent on the health of the retina and its photoreceptors to acquire the image. 
These considerations, however, are not our emphasis here. Instead, we consider the sensitivity of 
brain mechanisms to extract increasing levels of details from an image given a sufficiently clear 
image at the retinal level. This ability seems so fundamental to the rest of vision, that it is tempting 
to assume that it must be an innate property of the visual system. If this building block is not 
available, how could vision in any form even exist? It turns out that this view is largely correct, but 
with some nuances.  
Normal acuity development in the human infant is relatively gradual. Figure 1.3a summarizes the 
progression of acuity improvement in the normal child. There is a 5-fold increase in acuity from 
birth to six months, and a 40-fold improvement at adult levels (Maurer & Lewis, 2001). 
Improvement continues until about 6 years of age. Acuity levels tend to follow gestational age (i.e., 
time from conception) as opposed to birth age (Weinacht, Kind, Monting, & Gottlob, 1999), 
indicating a prescribed timeline somewhat independent of the extra visual experience that 
premature infants receive compared to their normal-term counterparts.  
This prolonged development is driven largely by anatomical changes in the fovea, including 
increases in the packing density and decreases in the diameter of the foveolar cones (Yuodelis & 
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Hendrickson, 1986). This evidence is consistent with a maturational account of acuity development. 
However, even with optimal retinal development, visual experience is necessary for the 
development of acuity in visual cortex: Infants with dense bilateral congenital cataracts who were 
tested soon after corrective surgery have much poorer functional acuity than their gestational age 
would predict, but improvement followed as soon as 1 week later, with further improvement still 
evident after 1 month (Maurer, Lewis, Brent, & Levin, 1999).  Yet, improvement seems subject to a 
critical period. After approximately 2 months of age, a full recovery of normal acuity is highly 
unlikely (Figure 1.3b), though even the patient who received treatment at the age of 8 years 
attained acuity of 20/250 (Kugelberg, 1992), which qualifies as legal blindness but is still usable 
vision. 
 (A) (B)  
Figure 1.3 (A) Progression of grating acuity in normal children (from (Maurer & Lewis, 2001). (B) Acuity achieved in children 
with congenital bilateral cataracts resulting in deprivation of patterned light stimulus (Kugelberg, 1992). The horizontal scale 
represents the age at test. Patients wore corrective contact lenses during test. Circle points correspond to infants who were 
2 months or younger at the time of corrective surgery; square points correspond to children 3 months of age to 8 years. The 
area between the two continuous lines represents normal age-dependent acuity. 
Color discrimination in infants has also been extensively studied. Color vision, like acuity, is mostly 
dependent on the properties of foveolar cones. Expectedly, the development of color vision mimics 
the development of acuity (Kelly, Borchert, & Teller, 1997). Unlike acuity, color deprivation in the 
monkey during the expected critical period (3 months) has been shown to result in no 
diminishment in spectral sensitivity (Brenner, Schelvis, & Nuboer, 1985), indicating that color is 
even less influenced by cortical plasticity than acuity. 
Stereopsis, another low-level visual cue, begins to develop by the age of 3 months and is relatively 
mature by the age of 6 months in the infant (Birch, Shimojo, & Held, 1985), although improvements 
can be seen until at least 5 years of age (Simons, 1981). Visual deprivation (both monocular and 
binocular) in congenital cataract patients generally precludes stereopsis, though some patients 
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treated prior to 10 months of age exhibit some stereo acuity when the patients’ amblyopia is 
compensated for (Tytla, Lewis, Maurer, & Brent, 1993). The story of “Stereo Sue”—a woman who 
trained herself to see in stereo after decades without the ability—is an interesting counterpoint 
(Sacks, 2006), but it is likely that she had the appropriate neuronal response properties already; it 
was the interpretation of these binocular disparity cues that may have been learned. According to 
Sacks, it is apparently not unheard of to lose stereopsis due to a lack of depth experience, as he 
observed while living in a small, windowless room in a hospital. Perhaps the perception of depth 
that results from the process of stereopsis, being indeed a property of the physical world rather 
than an image-level property, belongs in our higher-level vision category; the computation of 
binocular disparity would be the low-level visual process.  
 
Finally, we come to local motion processing. The development of motion sensitivity is very rapid in 
the infant. Smooth-pursuit eye movements indicating the ability to track a moving target are 
evident in newborn infants 1-3 days old (Kremenitzer, Vaughan, Kurtzberg, & Dowling, 1979). 
Optokinetic nystagmus (OKN), a sign of motion coherence detection, is apparent from birth and 
shows little improvement over the first 6-8 months in infants, though adult thresholds are 
significantly better (Manny & Fern, 1990; Mason, Braddick, & Wattam-Bell, 2003). In the kitten, 
neurons in the primary visual cortex exhibit motion-direction selectivity at birth (Hubel & Wiesel, 
1963). The immediate availability of local motion cues from birth, prior to any visual experience, 
points to an innate maturational provenance. 
1.2.3 Higher-level visual development 
Lower-level vision forms the foundation for the seemingly more difficult higher-level visual 
processes, yet it is unclear what aspects of lower-level vision are truly required for what we might 
term the “next stage” of vision. A certain level of acuity is obviously necessary, as otherwise the 
visual field blurs into a uniform field of luminance, but the abilities to process color and determine 
depth of objects through stereopsis seem useful but optional. Luminance comparison is necessary 
as well, while motion sensitivity is of course important for processing changes in the physical 
world, but it is not necessary for parsing unchanging scenes. Individuals with total color-blindness 
(monochromacy), as well as most other mammals, achieve otherwise normal functional vision, as 
do individuals with congenital stereo blindness or those with only one functioning eye; however, no 
known cases of individuals with a congenital case of motion blindness (Zihl, von Cramon, & Mai, 
1983) are known in order to make this determination.  
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It is not known exactly what lower-level visual processes are necessary in order to allow higher-
level processes to develop, but lower-level vision develops so rapidly that abilities, in particular 
acuity, should be sufficient to enable this development at one month of age or earlier. Thus, 
progression of higher-level visual abilities after one month should not generally be significantly 
deterred by the still-developing lower-level abilities.  
In order to understand visual development, the most direct method is to study infants. In this vein, 
a highly productive line of enquiry began with Kellman and Spelke (1983) and was continued by 
these researchers and others. In this series of experiments, researchers studied the ability of infants 
to perceive an object as a whole when it is obscured by an occluder (see Chapter 4 for details). As 
early as 2-months of age, infants could perceive the whole object (as judged through a preferential 
looking paradigm) if the object behind the occluder underwent motion, allowing the infant to see 
the parts of the object segregated by the occluder moving together (Johnson & Aslin, 1995). 
However, the ability to perceive the object as a whole without the use of motion (using only cues 
based on the form of the object, such as, presumably, continuity of contour) does not develop until 
the age of 6.5 months (Craton, 1996), and the ability to discern the form of the hidden area did not 
appear until 8 months.  
Although this timeline for the development of object integration processes may seem long, there is 
evidence that this system may not be fully developed even until adolescence. Kovács and colleagues 
(Kovács, Kozma, Fehér, & Benedek, 1999) found that the ability to integrate contours across large 
visual angles continued to improve from the ages of 5 years to 13 years. A similar pattern is 
observed for the development of configural face processing: improvements in configural processing 
are evident at 6, 8, and 10 years of age (Mondloch, Le Grand, & Maurer, 2002). The processing of 
global versus local patterns also changes from childhood to adolescence and even into adulthood 
(Scherf, Behrmann, Kimchi, & Luna, 2009), with a trend towards improvement in global integration 
to overcome a local processing bias. 
These findings in infants and children point to a long period of visual development to attain adult-
level performance, although the fundamentals of higher-level vision are available within just the 
first two years. Is this progression an example of learning from visual experience or a protracted 
maturational period? Because both processes are occurring concurrently in children, it is 
impossible to discern between these two possibilities. 
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We turn now our attention to studies of higher-level visual development involving visual 
deprivation. Early studies on visual deprivation from birth in animals have resulted in near-
blindness immediately after sight onset, but with subsequent recovery of some visual function, for 
instance with rats dark-reared until maturity (Hebb, 1937) and monkeys dark-reared until 16 
months (Riesen, 1947). In the case of rats, this recovery was rapid (minutes), whereas Riesen’s 
monkeys took weeks to exhibit visual behaviors.  
Historical case studies of visually deprived humans have been rare and somewhat controversial. 
Von Senden (1932) catalogs a number of cases of visual deprivation throughout history, including 
the famed and slightly better documented case of a 13 year old boy whose congenital bilateral 
cataracts were operated upon by William Cheselden (the first published case, from 1728). Cases of 
long deprivation generally result in a lack of vision, as in animals, immediately following correction, 
but long-term follow-up is usually given inadequate consideration. In fact, von Senden implies that 
the boy in the Cheselden case did begin to acquire functional vision: “… [H]is powers of vision only 
developed very gradually; it would even appear … as though he did not acquire a real 
understanding of the extent of space until … a year after the first [eye was operated on]” (Senden, 
1960, p. 223). More recently, two important cases have attracted attention. The case of SB (Gregory 
& Wallace, 1963) describes a 52 year old man who obtained a corneal graft after a life of congenital 
blindness. SB acquired only very limited sight, but formal follow-up was limited to only six months 
after treatment. The case of MM (Fine et al., 2003) describes a man who lost his sight at the age of 
three and a half years old and received a corneal and limbal stem-cell transplant at the age of 43. 
MM received a more thorough examination of his visual abilities than the other patients, and the 
results are somewhat surprising. MM performed well on several motion tasks and some simple 
form tasks but failed on tasks requiring the interpretation of illusory contours or the reconstruction 
of depth. Even a few years of follow-up did not qualitatively alter his results. This is especially 
surprising given that MM had 3.5 years of normal vision prior to his loss of sight, at which point he 
would have had perfectly adequate vision to perform these visual tasks. This implies a significant 
amount of regression in his visual abilities, to the point where his recovery is poorer than that 
suggested by von Senden’s account of Cheselden’s 13 year old congenitally blind patient and 
certainly poorer than the cases to be discussed in our work. For now, we will leave this as a 
curiosity, noting only that the presence of sight followed by its disruption and subsequent recovery 
is a more complicated case than congenital deprivation followed by treatment; we propose a 
potential theory to reconcile this pattern in our final chapter. 
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More subtle deficiencies have been found in cases of short-term congenital deprivation, even after 
many years of subsequent visual experience. Children with congenital blindness due to cataracts 
were treated at ages between 2 and 6 months and tested, at the age of 10 years, on a task matching 
faces differing in subtle manipulations of facial feature configurations (Le Grand, Mondloch, Maurer, 
& Brent, 2001). With the relatively short period of deprivation and long period of visual experience 
after recovery, it is tempting to infer that the first few months of life represent a critical period for 
the maturation or development of full visual function, yet this conclusion seems premature given 
that these deficits are quite subtle. We have already discussed that configural processing develops 
slowly in the child, so it is less likely that this early period of deprivation would directly affect a 
process known to develop substantially later. Perhaps a more likely explanation is that this early 
period sets a bias or priority on the complement to configural information: featural processing. This 
bias might come from the alteration in acuity development (recall that acuity develops rapidly once 
vision is restored); more experience at worse acuities in the normally developing infant may favor 
configural processing (Pinto, Moulson, & Sinha, 2009), which may rely more heavily on lower 
spatial frequencies than featural processing, which requires a relatively high level of detail. 
1.3 Towards a theory of visual development 
From the survey above, a picture of visual development begins to emerge. Low-level visual 
processes can be affected by deprivation or degenerate visual input, but largely they mature on a 
set timeline. Where visual deprivation can significantly disrupt development (as is the case for 
acuity), the primary effects of the disruption occur during a critical period in the first few months of 
life, after which recovery may occur, but never to normal levels. Thus, we generally conclude that 
low-level vision is a product of maturation. 
The development of higher-level vision, however, paints a more complex picture. Although 
deprivation in the first year of life can have ramifications for high-level processes into adolescence, 
these deficits are quite subtle and do not seem to qualitatively affect vision. Furthermore, these 
abilities emerge rather slowly over the first year of life, then continue to improve even into 
adulthood. Some evidence points to the existence of a critical period of several years, after which 
high-level vision can no longer properly emerge, but this evidence is incomplete. Studies of brain 
plasticity have yielded remarkable evidence of the general ability of the brain to adapt to and make 
use of signals intended for other cortical regions, but this evidence does not speak to the complex 
processes involved in high-level vision, nor does it yet address plasticity during maturity. The 
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evidence is still insufficient to conclude whether high-level vision is acquired through visual 
experience or is a product of a slow maturational process. 
In order to discern between these two possibilities, the timeline of maturation must somehow be 
separated from the process of high-level vision acquisition. That is, we require a subject population 
for whom visual maturation has mostly come to an end, but who have not experienced patterned 
visual stimulation. We have come across such a population in Project Prakash (Mandavilli, 2006), a 
long-term project to locate, provide treatment, and learn from the curably blind in India, which has 
a disproportionate number of such cases due to socioeconomic, geographical and traditional 
factors. Despite the relatively large number of curably blind in India, however, we seek a much 
smaller subset of these patients for our studies here. Our subjects must have been blind or severely 
compromised from birth in both eyes, and their congenital blindness must have been documented 
or be otherwise verifiable. Furthermore, we must have the opportunity to study each subject 
longitudinally, a sometimes difficult requirement in ever-changing India. Over a number of years, 
we have managed to find a dozen or so such cases (and a larger number of in-between cases not 
suitable for our discussions here), and a few of them have been chosen for publication and inclusion 
here. 
Our first concern is whether an individual with such a history of long-term visual deprivation will 
ever gain normal vision. If there is indeed a hard critical period for high-level vision (after which 
normal vision is unattainable), then any progress following intervention may be merely a set of 
visual “hacks” which have little to do with normal visual development. Thus, chapter 2 presents the 
case of SRD, who serves to dispel the notion of a hard critical period for the acquisition of high-level 
vision. SRD was born with dense congenital bilateral cataracts and was by all accounts functionally 
blind from birth2. After treatment for her cataracts at the age of 12 years, SRD reportedly was 
unable to make significant use of her vision for about one year, after which she began to recognize 
objects purely by sight. We tested her extensively 20 years later and found that she had mostly 
normal visual skills, although with somewhat limited acuity. Hence, SRD gives us evidence that the 
endpoint for individuals with visual deprivation of up to 12 years is a mostly normal visual system, 
given adequate time for it to develop after clinical intervention3.  
                                                             
2 In all cases of such “blindness,” there must always be sufficient vision to enable sufficiently normal maturation of 
low-level visual processes. Perception of light (that is, the ability to tell light from dark but with absence of form 
vision) seems sufficient for this purpose. 
3 There does remain the possibility that SRD acquired a highly functional visual system through a general learning 
process which bears no resemblance to the normal human visual system. This, however, seems unlikely as (1) such 
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Knowing that even long-term visual deprivation (with the caveats of footnote 2) does not preclude 
the eventual acquisition of near-normal vision, our next goal was to study the stages of visual 
acquisition immediately following treatment. If vision is available immediately after optical 
correction with little exposure to visual experience, then a maturational account of visual 
development would almost certainly be correct. If, however, acquisition of high-level visual 
function requires a significant amount of time and resembles the trajectory of normal infant visual 
development, a theory of high-level visual development based on learning through visual 
experience would be a more likely alternative, as maturational processes should have already 
reached their endpoints prior to intervention4. Chapter 3 discusses the cases of three individuals 
who were functionally blind from birth and received treatment at the ages of 7, 13 and 29 years. 
They were tested immediately or soon after treatment and followed longitudinally with a large 
battery of tests of low- and high-level vision. To our surprise, the visual parsing performance of 
these subjects soon after treatment resembled the over-fragmented world observed by infants in 
the first few months of life. Similar to the observed performance of infants, the fragments of their 
visual world came together to make objects whenever these fragments shared common motion. To 
our greater surprise, after 8 months in the case of our youngest subject and after 18 months for our 
oldest subject, these individuals had begun to develop the higher-level visual abilities that allowed 
them to properly parse complex static scenes. 
This pattern of evidence is highly consistent with a learning account of visual development, as 
opposed to an innate, maturational account. But how does the visual system learn such a complex 
process? If a visual system does not yet have a concept of “objectness,” how could this concept ever 
develop? Based on the pattern of performance we see in our subjects as well as the research on 
infant visual development, chapter 4 proposes a method of bootstrapping this learning process 
through the notion of common motion as a proxy for proto-object representations.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
a visual system would likely have more significant observable differences from our expectations and (2) it would be 
odd and wasteful for an organism that has the capacity to create a perfectly viable visual system de novo to instead 
not use this capacity but rely on a maturational program. Thus, the most likely explanation is that SRD’s visual 
system is the product of delayed but mostly normal maturation, or that the visual system of typical individuals and 
that of SRD are acquired from visual experience through similar learning mechanisms. 
4 Although there is no physical evidence for it, there is a third alternative. Maturational processes may lie dormant, 
waiting for visual input in order to be re-enabled at the appropriate time. There is indeed a fourth alternative, 
where maturation of the higher-level visual system completes, but years of dormancy have obscured its function, 
relying on new stimulation to “uncover” its function, though it seems unlikely that this uncovering would result in a 
staged acquisition of function resembling the progression of infant development; this staged progression is indeed 
what we see in our subjects. Further thoughts on this complication are discussed in the final chapter of this thesis. 
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Finally, we conclude in the final chapter with caveats for the interpretations of our work, the 
implications of this research to vision science as well as the real world, and thoughts on future work 
to generalize our findings to crossmodal integration.  
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Abstract 
Animal studies suggest that visual deprivation early in the lifespan can have profound 
consequences, causing functional blindness for the remainder of the animal’s life. However, very 
little human data exist on this issue. Given enough time for recovery, can a person who has suffered 
several years of congenital blindness gain visual skills? Addressing this question is difficult since 
instances of sight acquisition late in life are extremely rare. We had an unusual opportunity to work 
with an individual in India whose case-history sheds light on this question. SRD was born blind, 
and remained so until the age of 12 years. She then underwent surgery for the removal of dense 
congenital cataracts. We evaluated her performance on an extensive battery of visual tasks 20 years 
after her surgery. We found that although SRD's acuity is compromised, she is highly proficient on 
mid/high-level visual tasks. These results suggest that the human brain retains an impressive 
capacity for visual learning well into late childhood. They have implications for our conceptions of 
cortical plasticity, and argue for treating congenital blindness even in older children.  
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Through a combination of innate predispositions, cortical maturation and experience, a child comes 
to acquire complex visual skills. Evidence from several animal studies suggests that early visual 
experience is crucial for the subsequent development of visual skills (Wiesel and Hubel, 1965; Hein, 
Held and Gower, 1970; Bauer and Held, 1975; Hubel et al., 1977; LeVay et al., 1980).  In the context 
of these results, an important open question is whether the unfolding of the program of visual 
development in humans is tied to critical periods in early childhood: Can a person acquire visual 
function after being deprived of sight for an extended period from birth?  
To address this question, one would need to assess visual function in human subjects with various 
lengths of deprivation and after varying amounts of time post-deprivation. This is shown 
schematically in Figure 2.1. Conventional developmental studies with normal children correspond 
to points along the ordinate. Given that ethical considerations rule out a deliberate deprivation of 
sight, it has been difficult to acquire data for the rest of this space. Instances of sight onset late in 
the lifespan are extremely rare. Valvo estimates that fewer than 20 such cases have been reported 
over the past 1000 years (Valvo, 1971). Consequently, the literature on sight recovery beyond 
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several years of age is rather sparse (Von Senden, 1932; Gregory and Wallace, 1963; Valvo, 1971; 
Ackroyd et al, 1974; Carlson and Hyvarinen, 1983; Carlson et al, 1986; Sacks, 1995; Le Grand et al, 
2001; Fine et al, 2003; Maurer et al, 2005). 
 
Figure 2.1 A conceptual space for studying the influence of deprivation duration and recovery duration on visual 
development. Previous studies have examined individuals whose histories place them close to one of the two 
axes. The person described in this paper, SRD, lies in a largely unexplored region of this space and allows us to 
assess the extent of visual recovery possible even after a very long initial period of congenital blindness, 
following an extended period of visual experience. 
 
A recently launched initiative, 'Project Prakash'1 (Sinha, 2003) has facilitated our search for 
individuals treated after prolonged congenital blindness. Here we report a case study from this 
Project: SRD, a woman who suffered an extended period of visual deprivation, was treated, and 
then had several years over which to acquire visual function. She corresponds to a point in the 
upper right sector of our two-dimensional 'Deprivation-Experience' space. SRD allows us to assess 
the extent of visual functionality possible with an extended recovery period, even after a very long 
initial period of congenital blindness. 
Although Figure 2.1 places all the points corresponding to the various studies of visual skill 
acquisition on one plot, it is important to note that the developmental processes across the cases 
might be quite different from each other. Specifically, studies of late sight onset are not equivalent 
to studies of normal infant development. A 10 year old immediately following treatment for 
congenital blindness differs greatly from a newborn who has just opened her eyes. Unlike the 
newborn, the 10 year hold has had extensive experience of the environment through sensory 
                                                             
1 Project Prakash is a charitable and scientific endeavor whose goal is to locate congenitally blind children in India, 
treat those whose blindness is correctable, and study their subsequent visual development.  
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modalities other than vision. This experience has likely led to the creation of internal 
representations that may well interact with the acquisition of visual object concepts. Gregory and 
Wallace (1963), for instance, found evidence that SB could rapidly transfer his haptically acquired 
knowledge to visual tasks. Furthermore, the deprivation may have led to structural changes in 
neural organization. For instance, projections from other senses may have claimed sections of the 
cortex that, in normal brains, would be devoted to visual processing. Thus, a priori, we cannot 
assume that the developmental course in the 10 year old will necessarily be similar to that in the 
newborn. In fact, in this paper we are particularly interested in the differences between the two 
cases, since they would also allow us to make inferences about neural plasticity and critical periods 
for specific tasks.  
In this paper, we describe SRD's history and then present results from a battery of tests designed to 
assess her visual function. Our goal was to determine whether the prolonged deprivation that SRD 
had suffered had completely obliterated her ability to gain visual skills post-operatively, as a strict 
interpretation of the ‘critical period’ account would predict (Wiesel and Hubel, 1965; LeVay et al, 
1980). 
 
2.2 SRD: Case Description  
 
SRD is a 34 year old female living in the Indian state of Gujarat. We met SRD serendipitously at a 
city eye-clinic in Ahmedabad in July, 2003. We were able to reconstruct SRD’s history from 
interviews with her, her parents, the physicians who attended to her at birth, and those at the clinic 
she visits currently. 
 
2.2.1 Family History and Early Childhood 
 
SRD’s father has congenital cataracts and has been blind since birth. Her mother has normal 
eyesight. SRD has two younger siblings: a sister, who has normal vision, and a brother with 
strabismus. Interviews with the midwife who delivered her indicate that SRD had profound vision 
problems and readily visible dense cataract formations at birth. When SRD was 1.5 months old, her 
parents brought her to a local physician for examination. The doctor diagnosed her as having dense 
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bilateral congenital cataracts. Given the lack of pediatric surgical facilities, the physician 
recommended that surgery be postponed until SRD was older. At the age of 12 years, SRD 
underwent cataract removal surgery. No intra-ocular lenses were implanted. SRD is, therefore, 
aphakic in both eyes. Eyeglasses were provided to compensate for the missing intra-ocular lenses. 
The surgery succeeded in the left eye but not in the right because of complications resulting from 
glaucoma, providing SRD with vision only in the left eye.  
Our interviews with SRD’s parents were structured to help us obtain as accurate a picture about 
SRD’s pre-operative vision as possible. The parents told us that SRD was able to tell the difference 
between overall levels of light, as in night versus day. However, her pattern vision was greatly 
compromised. She would trip over things when placed in a new environment. For this reason, SRD 
would never venture out of the house on her own, and was always accompanied by her father or 
her grandmother on her walks outside the house. Within the house (which we visited, and found to 
be very small – a total floor area of about 10’ x 12’), SRD managed to walk around due to her 
familiarity with the layout of the room. The shelves and a few items of furniture were placed in 
fixed locations, which SRD learned through tactual experience. SRD’s profound visual impairment 
was also evident in her interactions with people. Her parents told us that she was unable to orient 
towards them unless they spoke or otherwise made a sound. Thus, as best as we could assess, SRD 
spent the first 12 years of her childhood without visual stimuli, barring the ability to perceive 
overall levels of ambient illumination. However, in the absence of formal medical records, we 
acknowledge the necessarily approximate nature of this assessment and the possibility that her 
cataracts might have permitted some very limited amount of pattern vision pre-operatively. This 
does not significantly change the motivation for and inferences from this study, as the abilities 
which SRD may have had were in no way functional. 
 
2.2.2 Post-operative Experience 
 
Records of SRD’s acuity immediately following her surgery do not exist, but she still wears the same 
pair of eyeglasses 20 years later (+12 dioptres, 1.5 cylindrical in the left eye). Recent tests at the Eye 
Clinic in Ahmedabad indicate that her prescription is appropriate, and her best corrected acuity is 
20/200. After SRD’s surgery, her mother explicitly taught her objects around the house. The mother 
claims that SRD learned to recognize her siblings and parents 6 months after surgery, and after a 
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year, could name objects around the house purely by sight. She studied up to grade 5 in a school for 
blind children and then underwent two additional years of schooling in a school for normally 
sighted children. SRD was thus educated to the 7th grade level. She lived with her parents until she 
was married at the age of 27 and then moved to her husband’s village. 
SRD now earns money as a maid for five families in her town. She travels to the families’ houses, 
which are 1-2 km away, on her own. She can recognize members of the families that she works for. 
SRD does not use navigational aids, such as a cane, but occasionally asks passersby to guide her. 
We conducted a battery of experimental tests designed to probe several aspects of SRD’s object 
perception abilities during July, 2003. The overarching goal was to determine whether these skills 
could be acquired even after extended visual deprivation, which in SRD’s case had lasted 12 years. 
In order to examine several different aspects of visual skills in the limited time that we had to work 
with SRD, we adopted an experimental strategy that stressed breadth. The limitation of this 
approach is that we might have missed subtle deficits. However, it afforded us a chance to examine 
whether any particular skills were greatly compromised, and to assess the overall layout of her 
‘skill landscape’. 
 
2.3 Experimental assessment of SRD's visual function  
 
We decided to focus on two important domains of visual skills: basic form perception and face 
perception. Since these domains span a range of task complexity, it was our hope that they would 
be effective for assessing SRD’s visual skills. The specific tests we conducted were: 
 
Basic form perception Face perception 
Shape matching across space: visual search Face/Non-face discrimination 
Shape matching across time: visual memory Face localization in natural scenes 
Shape matching across transformations Face identification 
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Depth perception from monocular cues Gaze estimation 
Object segmentation Gender classification 
 
General methods: All experiments were conducted on a laptop computer with a 14.1” screen. 
Screen resolution was set to 1280 x 1024 pixels. Viewing distance was approximately 30cm. In 
order to have a benchmark against which to compare SRD’s performance, we also recruited a 
normally sighted control subject, who was matched to SRD for age (32 years), gender, education 
(7th grade) and socio-economic status (housemaid in New Delhi). Additionally, we enlisted four 
subjects in the United States, ranging in age from 25 to 30 years, with normal or corrected to 
normal acuity. The control subject in India (the ‘status-matched control’) viewed the stimuli from a 
distance of 50 cm. The remaining controls (the ‘acuity-matched controls’) were seated 3 m from the 
screen to approximate image information loss due to SRD’s compromised acuity. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the tests, and results from SRD and control subjects. Further details regarding 
experimental methods are included in the appendix to this chapter. 
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Table 1 
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Table 1 (contd.) 
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2.4 Discussion 
 
Overall, SRD exhibited a high level of proficiency on most of our form and face perception tests. We 
did observe some differences in her performance relative to control subjects’, such as longer 
reaction-times for shape matching tasks, susceptibility to overall luminance levels in face 
recognition and a reliance on head orientation for gaze estimation. It is possible, therefore, that 
SRD’s strategies for image analysis might be different from those resulting from normal visual 
development. While this does not rule out residual impairments, this body of results does suggest 
that significant functional recovery is possible even after several years of congenital visual 
deprivation.  
An important limitation we faced in studying SRD was that we were observing her visual 
performance well after sight onset. We had thus missed the developmental progression of her 
visual skills. It is possible, at least in principle, that the visual proficiencies SRD now exhibits were 
not learned, but rather arose through the maturational unfolding of an innately specified program. 
While possible, we believe that this is unlikely. The large body of research that has examined visual 
development in children with normal sight has underscored the importance of learning from 
experience in skill acquisition (Diamond and Carey, 1977; Slater, 1998; Johnson, 1998). 
Experiments with other individuals who have recovered sight after prolonged blindness, and who 
have been studied soon after sight onset, have indicated that skills are learned over time through 
experience with the visual environment (Gregory, 1990). Furthermore, reports from SRD’s parents, 
though admittedly subjective, also indicate that SRD went through an extended period of learning, 
lasting several months, before she was able to recognize people and other objects. All of these 
pieces of evidence, while not definitive, make it likely that SRD’s visual proficiencies were acquired 
via learning, instead of being innately available. 
Visual learning can be thought of as comprising two components: 1. parsing the visual image, and 2. 
attaching labels to visual entities. Gregory and Wallace (1963) found that their subject SB showed 
the most improvements in his ability to attach labels to things. The early stages of SRD’s post-
operative experience might have been similar, but we do not have any data from that phase of her 
development. What our data do show, however, is that at present (18 years after her surgery) SRD’s 
skills appear to go beyond attaching labels to familiar objects. Her ability to match novel shapes, 
segment images, use cues such as shading, and detect instances of objects in complex scenes, attests 
to her general image analysis skills. 
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The general picture that emerges from these experiments is an encouraging one. Our primary 
objective was to determine whether the long congenital deprivation would rule out even the most 
rudimentary of visual skills, as would be expected from a strict reading of the ‘critical period’ 
hypothesis (Wiesel and Hubel, 1965; LeVay et al, 1980). This seems not to be the case. SRD not only 
performed well on our tests, but can also effectively use vision for her daily activities and is now 
well integrated into mainstream society. These results have at least two important implications, 
one scientific and the other societal. 
From the scientific perspective, our results suggest that the visual cortex retains its plasticity even 
across several years of highly compromised visual experience. This forces a rethinking of the 
conventional notion of developmental critical periods and also opens up some interesting questions 
regarding changes in cortical organization that might accompany the observed increase in visual 
proficiency. 
From the societal health-care perspective, our results provide an argument for late stage blindness 
treatments. Ophthalmologists in India, as elsewhere, believe that treatment is of little use once a 
child is older than 7 or 8 years of age, since recovery is likely to be limited or non-existent. What 
SRD’s results demonstrate is that even treatment at the age of 12 years can have good outcomes. 
Indeed, we do not know what, if any, is the upper bound on age of effective treatment. Even as 
Project Prakash gathers such data, we believe that it is appropriate to propose that health-care 
providers should not withhold treatment on the basis of age. There may well be other contra-
indications to late treatments (such as disorders of the posterior eye segment), but age on its own, 
should not be one of them. 
The one key inference we draw from these results is that the visual skill acquisition programs of the 
human brain remain intact to an impressive extent even when the normal timeline of their 
deployment has been delayed by many years. 
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2.6 Appendix: Supplementary material 
 
(Supplementary material to accompany 
‘Vision Following Extended Congenital Blindness’ 
by Y. Ostrovsky, A. Andalman and P. Sinha) 
 
 
We decided to focus on two important domains of visual skills: basic form perception and face 
perception. Since these domains span a range of task complexity, it was our hope that they would 
be effective for assessing SRD’s visual skills. The specific tests we conducted were organized as 
follows: 
 
Basic form perception Face perception 
Shape matching across space: visual search Face/Non-face discrimination 
Shape matching across time: visual memory Face localization in natural scenes 
Shape matching across transformations Face identification 
Depth perception from monocular cues Gaze estimation 
Object segmentation Gender classification 
Visual illusions 
 
  
41 
 
In what follows, we describe each of these tests and SRD’s responses. 
 
2.6.1 Basic Form Perception 
Skills such as matching simple shapes, searching for them amidst distractors and compensating for 
appearance changes caused by image transformations, are the building blocks of complex scene-
analysis and object-recognition abilities. Given their fundamental significance for spatial 
perception, we devoted the first half of our test battery to these basic form perception tasks. 
 
2.6.1.1 Shape matching across space: Visual Search 
We tested SRD’s ability to search for designated shapes within a matrix of distractors. Three sample 
stimulus displays are shown in Figure 2.2. The polygonal shapes spanned, on average, 4 degrees of 
visual angle horizontally and vertically.  The polygons were drawn in bright saturated colors, and 
within each trial all the polygons were the same color.  The target polygons included simple regular 
polygons, arbitrary convex polygons, and complex polygons with numerous concavities. 
 
     
Figure 2.2 Three sample displays used to assess SRD’s ability to match shapes and distinguish them from distracters. In each 
display, the designated target shape is shown on the left and the search matrix is one the right. SRD was asked to indicate 
whether the target appeared in the matrix (there were an equal number of target present/absent trials) and if so, to point to 
its location. SRD’s performance was perfect on all trials. 
 
Each trial proceeded as follows: The target polygon was shown alone on the left side of the screen 
and SRD was free to observe it for as long as she wanted. At her signal, a matrix of either 4 or 9 
polygons appeared to the right of the target.  SRD was asked whether the target was present within 
the matrix and, if so, to signal its location by touching it on the screen. SRD made no errors on all 11 
trials (p << 0.001 compared to chance; χ2 test), however we observed that her response times were 
slower than the control’s. The status-matched control subject, who also made no errors, was able to 
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correctly respond within 2 seconds on each display, while SRD’s response times ranged from 5 to 
20 seconds. Acuity-matched controls also performed with no errors. 
 
2.6.1.2 Shape matching across time: Visual Memory 
As the temporal analogue of spatial shape matching, we tested SRD’s ability to remember polygonal 
shapes over short periods of time. Two sets of polygons were displayed: a training set and a test set. 
SRD was allowed to study the training set without time restriction (typically ranging between 5 to 
10 seconds per polygon), and was then asked to identify the training set members in the test set. 
The test sessions followed the training after a delay of 5 seconds. The polygons were similar to 
those used in the visual search task.  They were uniformly colored and on average spanned 4 
degrees of visual angle. Within each trial, all of the polygons were the same color. We ran three 
trials. The first two trials each had a training set of one polygon and a test set of five polygons, while 
the third had three training polygons and 15 test polygons. Figure 2.3 shows the overall design of 
this task. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Task design for assessing SRD’s ability to remember and match shapes presented across time. The training session 
was self-timed; SRD was allowed to look at the target pattern for as long as she wanted to. Upon presentation of the test 
polygons, SRD had to indicate whether they were the same as the previously seen target. SRD had a 100% hit rate and only 
two false positives. 
 
SRD performed well above criterion in all three trials (hits: 8, misses: 0, correct rejections: 15, false 
alarms: 2; d’ > 2.42). The status-matched control subject performed comparably, with just one false 
                                                             
2 Due to the absence of misses, a direct computation of the d’ score is not possible. Where the number of misses is 
0, we have substituted 1. Therefore, our d’ measurement is an under-estimate of the actual d’ score. 
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alarm (d’ > 2.8), as did the three acuity-matched controls (perfect, 2 misses, and 1 false alarm, 
respectively). 
2.6.1.3 Shape matching across transformations 
In the tests described so far, the target did not undergo any change between the training and test 
phases. However, in the real world, an important challenge is to recognize objects even when they 
may have been subjected to transformations such as rotations and scale changes. We sought to 
determine whether SRD could compensate for transformations during shape matching.  
Each display for this task consisted of a 2D or 3D geometric figure on the left side of the screen and 
two similar figures on the right side. SRD’s task was to identify which figure on the right (top or 
bottom) matched the figure on the left, ignoring changes in size, color, orientation and (in the case 
of 3D shapes) lighting direction. Figure 2.4 shows a few stimulus displays. 
SRD performed correctly on 24 out of 26 displays (p << 0.001; χ2 test); the control subjects made no 
errors. (The difference in performance between SRD and the control subjects was not significant.)  
Notably, she answered incorrectly when discriminating between a pentagon and a hexagon whose 
orientations were manipulated (see upper-right panel in Figure 2.4), perhaps due to the misleading 
similarity in orientation of the prominent peak of the pentagon and hexagon. She was not misled by 
similar manipulations of simpler shapes, such as a triangle versus a square.  
SRD performed well on 3D shapes, not being misled by such confounds as in the lower-right panel 
of Figure 2.4, where the illumination induced image-level similarities between the cube and the 
pentagonal prism are much greater than between the two cubes. 
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Figure 2.4 Sample displays from the shape matching across transformations experiment. For each display, SRD was asked to 
match the reference shape on the left with one of the two alternatives on the right, while ignoring transformations of scale, 
orientation, color or illumination. SRD matched 24 out of 26 trials correctly versus no errors by the control (see text for her 
mistakes). 
 
2.6.1.4 Depth estimation from monocular cues 
This series of 10 displays tested SRD’s ability to use image-based depth cues. The basic display 
consisted of two spheres in a virtual world with a textured ground plane (see Figure 2.5). This was 
then modified through the addition of shadows, changes in image-level vertical location, changes in 
relative image-level size, and atmospheric haze. SRD was asked to indicate which sphere was 
“closer,” “bigger,” and “higher”. In all trials, SRD’s answers were consistent with a normal three-
dimensional percept. That is, she appeared to be properly integrating image-based depth cues to 
form a 3D reconstruction of the image.  She even properly used atmospheric lighting effects to 
determine relative nearness, despite a contradictory size-constancy cue. Responses of the control 
subject were identical to SRD’s. 
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Figure 2.5 A few of the displays we used to assess SRD’s ability to estimate depth based on monocular scene cues. SRD’s 
assessment of all scenes was consistent with normal perception. 
 
2.6.1.5 Object segmentation 
So far, we have described tasks where the individual objects are entirely visible and figure-ground 
segregation is relatively straightforward. However, an important challenge in many settings is 
object segmentation – parsing a given image into coherent segments corresponding to distinct 
objects, even when they partially overlap and occlude each other. We tested SRD’s object 
segmentation ability using two tasks. The first required SRD to point to and count the number of 
objects she perceived within each scene. The second required her to identify the partially 
overlapping objects present within each scene. 
For the first task, we created 20 displays each consisting of two or three polygons with or without 
overlap. Each polygon spanned, on average, 7 degrees of visual angle. Two special trials were 
included in which photographs of overlapping pool-balls and wooden building blocks were used. 
Figure 2.6 shows some of the experimental displays. 
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Figure 2.6 Four sample displays of the kind we used to assess SRD’s image segmentation skills. For each display, SRD was 
asked to indicate the number of objects and point to their locations. SRD indicated the same objects as normal subjects on 
all trials. 
 
SRD reported the same counts as the control in all 20 trials including those involving transparency, 
or unfilled line-drawings.  Her success on the photographs of identically stained wooden building 
blocks was especially impressive given her acuity.  This trial required the use of shading cues and 
small misalignments of bounding contours. 
The second task required SRD to identify photographs of real-world objects such as trucks, cars, 
cups, saucers and spectacles. Each display comprised two objects with partial overlap. Figure 2.7 
shows some of the experimental displays. SRD was able to correctly name all objects except a 
photograph of a fish, which she labeled an alligator. The control subject made no errors on either of 
the two tasks. 
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Figure 2.7 Two sample displays of the kind we used to assess SRD’s object naming skills in the presence of partial overlap. For 
each display, SRD was asked to name and point to all of the objects in the scene. SRD identified all objects that we tested, 
except the fish, which was labeled as an alligator. 
 
2.6.1.6 Susceptibility to visual illusions 
We concluded our testing of SRD’s basic form perception skills with a small battery of classic 
illusions. Our intent was to determine how congruent SRD’s responses were to those of normal 
observers. Significantly divergent responses would indicate differences in the underlying visual 
processing mechanisms. The specific tests we conducted were the Müller-Lyer illusion, inverted T 
illusion, 3-dot bisection hyperacuity and the simultaneous contrast illusion. Some of our displays 
are shown in Figure 2.8. As described in the figure caption, SRD was susceptible to all of these 
illusions in a manner consistent with normal observers.  
 
Figure 2.8 Sample displays from our tests of SRD’s susceptibility to some classic visual illusions. (a) Müller-Lyer illusion; SRD 
was asked to indicate which line appeared longer and was instructed to pay attention to the line only, and not the overall 
size of the object. (b) Bisection hyperacuity display. SRD was asked to say whether the middle dot was to the left or right of 
center. She performed perfectly down to a 5 pixel offset (corresponding to approximately 18 minutes of visual angle). (c) 
Inverted T and arch illusion. SRD was asked to indicate whether the T’s vertical or horizontal line segment appeared longer, 
and whether the arch was greater in width or height. She consistently chose the T’s vertical stem and indicated that the arch 
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was taller than wide. (d) Simultaneous-contrast illusion. Even though the two small squares are of the same physical 
luminance, SRD, like normal observers, reported the square on the right as being darker. 
 
Overall, SRD’s performance on the basic object perception tasks included in our test battery is close 
to that of the control subject. While this does not mean that she does not have any residual 
impairments, this body of results does suggest that a significant level of proficiency on form-
perception skills can be acquired even after several years of congenital visual deprivation. Our next 
set of experiments tested SRD’s performance on more complex and ecologically relevant form-
perception tasks, specifically the analysis of faces. 
 
2.6.2 Face Processing 
In the domain of face perception, we considered two broad classes of skills: (1) distinguishing 
between faces and non-faces (closely related to localizing faces in complex scenes), and (2) making 
use of intrinsic face information for assessing attributes such as identity, gender and gaze-direction. 
Our tests with SRD were designed to probe both of these kinds of skills. 
 
2.6.2.1 Face/Non-face discrimination 
SRD was presented with randomly interleaved grayscale face and non-face patterns and was asked 
to classify them as such. Images were shown one at a time and remained on the screen until SRD 
had responded verbally ('Yes' or 'no' to the question: Is this a face?). Our stimulus set comprised 30 
patterns. Of these, 15 were faces of both genders in a frontal viewpoint, showing the face from the 
middle of the forehead to the chin. Each image subtended 7 degrees horizontally at a viewing 
distance of 30 cm. The set of non-face distracters comprised 15 patterns from natural images that 
had similar power-spectra as the face patterns and also false-positives of computational face-
classification systems. The system we used is Rowley et al's (Rowley, H. A., Baluja, S. and Kanade, T. 
(1998). Neural-network based face detection. IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine 
Intelligence, 20, 23-28.) scheme from CMU. Sample non-face images are shown in Figure 2.9. 
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Figure 2.9 A few of the face (top two rows) and non-face (bottom two rows) patterns used in our experiments. The non-face 
patterns comprise false alarms of computational face-detection systems and images with similar spectra as face images. SRD 
had a 100% hit rate, with 1 false positive. The status-matched control too had a perfect hit rate with 1 false positive.   
 
SRD achieved a perfect hit rate, correctly classifying all of the face patterns as faces. Her only 
mistake was one false-positive. The status-matched control subject too had a 100% hit rate and one 
false-positive. 
 
2.6.2.2 Face localization in scenes 
The face/non-face classification task described above is somewhat artificial in its design. In the 
real-world, we are typically faced with the task of locating faces in complex scenes. Success on this 
task depends not only on discriminating between faces and non-faces, but also on the use of 
additional information arising from the rest of the body and scene structure (Cox et al., Science, vol 
303, 115-117, 2004). We assessed SRD’s face localization skills on this more naturalistic task. 
SRD was shown 10 full-color natural images containing people in diverse settings. She was asked to 
point to faces in these scenes. The localization responses were recorded by the experimenter and 
their veridicality assessed relative to pre-determined face-location data for each stimulus image. 
Figure 2.10 shows a few sample scenes of the kind we used in the experiments. Scenes subtended 
30 x 22 degrees of visual angle at a viewing distance of 30cms. The scenes included faces in 
different viewpoints, ranging from profile to frontal. The widths of the faces ranged from 1 degree 
to 10 degrees. Across the entire stimulus set, we ensured that the faces were distributed evenly 
over the display area so as to avoid the development of positional biases in responses. 
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Figure 2.10 Sample scenes of the kind that we used in our study of face localization, wherein the subject was asked to point 
to all faces in the scene. SRD’s performance was flawless on this task. 
 
Both SRD and the control subject performed flawlessly on this task. SRD correctly pointed to all of 
the faces in the scenes and did not exhibit any false alarms.  
Given SRD’s impressive skills at generic face localization, we next assessed her ability to individuate 
people and determine their gender and gaze direction. 
 
2.6.2.3 Face Identification 
We probed SRD’s face identification abilities using a set of nine face matching tasks.  All nine tasks 
followed a delayed match to sample paradigm, and each comprised 3-5 trials.  In the first seven 
tasks, SRD was shown a sample face to remember followed by two faces, one of the same person, 
the other of a different person.  Both of the faces were transformed according to the task. SRD was 
then asked to select the face that was of the same person. The seven task transformations were: 1. 
vertical inversion, 2. occlusion of the upper-half, 3. occlusion of the lower-half, 4. 45 degree depth 
rotation, 5. Gaussian blur, 6. edge-detection (which transforms the images into black and white line 
drawings), 7. the luminance transform (changing the overall luminance of the face), and 8. feature 
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replacement (eyes and the mouth in one of the test faces were replaced by the eyes and the mouth 
of a randomly chosen face).   
The faces used in the task were chosen from the face database compiled by researchers at the Max-
Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics in Tuebingen, Germany.  The faces were displayed in 
color and subtended 10 degrees of visual angle horizontally. They were all clean shaven and had no 
artifacts that could aid identification (such as eye-glasses or moles). All faces were presented on a 
black background and were cropped at the hairline to prevent having the hair serve as an identity 
cue. Figure 2.11 shows some of our stimuli. 
 
(a)  
(b)  
Figure 2.11 Sample stimuli used to assess SRD’s face recognition performance. Shown here are five of the transformations 
we used – (a) occluding the upper half of the face, occluding the lower half and vertical inversion and (b) blur and edges-only. 
SRD was shown the target face in a self-timed fashion, and following a blank screen delay of approximately 2 seconds, the 
two alternatives were presented. SRD had to identify which of the two alternatives was the target face. The Gaussian blur 
filter we used had a radius of 14 pixels applied to face images with a pupil to pupil distance of 150 pixels. SRD’s reduced 
acuity is akin to a Gaussian filter of approximately 4 pixel radius. The edge versions of our face stimuli involve non-linearities 
such as thresholding and manual noise removal, and, therefore, do not permit a simple filtering analog. 
 
SRD’s performance was as follows: 
Vertical inversion:   5/5  
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Edges only:    3/3 
Featural changes:   3/3 
Upper-half occlusion:   4/5  
Bottom-half occlusion:   4/5  
Luminance changes:   3/5  
45 degree depth rotation:  3/5 
Gaussian blur:    3/5 
 
The control subject, by comparison, performed at ceiling on all of these tests. Although we are 
clearly working with a limited stimulus set size, some trends are evident. SRD’s performance, 
though not perfect, appears to be near normal for most transformations. Across the entire stimulus 
set, SRD’s performance is significantly above chance (p < 0.005; χ2 test). SRD’s aggregate 
performance was 28/36 which was slightly worse than our acuity-matched controls at 34/36, 
33/36, 31/36 and 33/36 (p<0.05; χ2 test). Our status-matched control probably performed better 
because her displays were not adjusted for acuity, suggesting that acuity may have been 
responsible for at least some of SRD’s remaining deficit. 
 
2.6.2.4 Gaze estimation 
In our day-to-day interpersonal exchanges, we use faces to extract more information than just 
identity. An important example is direction of gaze. Estimating gaze direction is a pre-requisite for 
tasks that require shared attention. We assessed how well SRD was able to estimate facial gaze 
direction. Given her impressive performance on the previous face perception tasks, we expected 
her to be quite proficient at determining gaze direction. We showed SRD 20 images of individuals 
facing the camera, but shifting their eyes to look in one of three different directions: straight ahead, 
left, or right (see Figure 2.12 for examples).  
Contrary to our expectations, SRD performed very poorly on this task. In all cases, she reported 
gaze consistent with the orientation of the head and ignoring the orientation of the iris. Even slight 
depth rotations of the head coupled with exaggerated eye positioning in the opposite direction 
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caused SRD to interpret gaze consistent with head pose and inconsistent with eye position. This 
was not due to an inability to resolve the irises in the images presented. At distances of about 1.5 m, 
SRD was able to correctly determine whether the pupil appeared to the left or to the right of center. 
When told that this positioning corresponded to gaze direction, SRD was surprised and said that 
she was unaware of such a correspondence. Eye-gaze estimation, thus, is a skill that is highly 
compromised in SRD. For the control subject, this task was trivially easy and she performed 
without errors on all of the stimuli. SRD’s reliance on head-orientation rather than the intra-ocular 
iris position as an indicator of gaze direction is perhaps a consequence of her compromised acuity. 
Poor acuity might render iris position irresolvable at distances typical of social interactions, while 
still permitting head orientation to serve as a useful cue.  
 
 
Figure 2.12 Sample images of the kind we used to assess SRD’s eye-gaze estimation skills. It was discovered that SRD used 
the orientation of the head, not of the eyes, as the cue to gaze orientation. She was neither perceptually nor cognitively 
aware of the relationship between eye orientation and gaze direction. 
 
 
2.6.2.5 Gender classification 
The final test of face perception we conducted asked SRD to specify the gender of 10 faces. The 10 
images were evenly divided across the genders and showed faces cropped at the forehead and the 
chin. Thus, hair and clothing were not available as cues. None of the women in the set were wearing 
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the traditional (for India) red dot on their forehead. SRD correctly classified all of the images. Her 
response times were comparable to those of the status-matched control subject.  
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Abstract 
How the visual system comes to bind diverse image regions into whole objects is not well 
understood. We recently had a unique opportunity to investigate this question when we met 
three congenitally blind individuals in India. After providing them treatment, we studied the 
early stages of their visual skills. We found that prominent figural cues of grouping, such as 
good-continuation and junction structure, were largely ineffective for image parsing. By 
contrast, motion cues were of profound significance in that they enabled intra-object 
integration and facilitated the development of object representations which permitted 
recognition in static images. Following several months of visual experience, the individuals’ 
performance improved, and they were able to use the previously ineffective static figural 
cues to correctly parse many static scenes. These results suggest that motion information 
plays a fundamental role in organizing early visual experience and that parsing skills can be 
acquired even late in life. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Individuals who acquire sight late in life provide a unique window into several aspects of visual 
development. Such cases, however, are extremely rare; fewer than 30 have been studied in any 
detail over the course of the past 1000 years (Valvo, 1971). Through a concerted effort to locate 
such individuals in underprivileged enclaves in India, a country with an estimated 25% of the 
world’s blind, we have been able to conduct longitudinal studies from sight onset up to 18 months 
later with three such patients, SK, JA and PB, providing an opportunity to add to this important but 
sparse body of work (Von Senden, 1932; Gregory and Wallace, 1963; Fine et al., 2003; Maurer et al., 
2005).  
Real-world images typically comprise many regions of different colors and luminances (Figure 3.1). 
Our visual systems are adept at integrating subsets of these regions into meaningful entities. How 
this is achieved is a fundamental question, and has been researched extensively in the domains of 
experimental and computational neuroscience (Wertheimer, 1938; Marr, 1982; Hummell and 
Biederman, 1992; Ullman, 1996; Hupe et al., 1998; Needham, 2001; Tu et al., 2003; Brady and 
Kersten, 2003). Much of the work has focused on the use of heuristics such as alignment of contours 
and similarity of texture statistics (Grossberg and Mingolla, 1985; Mumford and Shah, 1985; Field 
et al., 1993; Kovacs and Julesz, 1993; Leung and Malik, 1998; August et al., 1999). In circumscribed 
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domains, these heuristics can account rather well for human performance (Koffka, 1935; Kanizsa, 
1979; Elder and Zucker, 1998), but using them for analyzing real-world imagery remains an open 
challenge (Shi and Malik, 1997; Borenstein and Ullman, 2002). Furthermore, while it is evident that 
a mature visual system makes use of these cues, it is unclear whether these heuristics serve to 
organize information during the early stages of visual experience. Determining the nature of cues 
active at this time is important for elucidating the principles of visual learning and bootstrapping.  
Our studies with three individuals immediately after the onset of patterned vision provided a rare 
opportunity to examine the bootstrapping mechanisms for visual parsing and the progression of 
visual abilities due to visual experience. These studies were undertaken as part of Project Prakash, 
our initiative in India to identify, and provide medical care to, individuals with treatable congenital 
blindness (Mandavilli, 2006). In working with these individuals, we also have an opportunity to 
examine how time-bound is the development of the parsing skills, and whether it is subject to a 
‘critical period’. Earlier case-reports have demonstrated that individuals who acquire sight late in 
life show a profound deficit in interpreting the visual confusion which they suddenly encounter 
(Von Senden, 1932; Gregory and Wallace, 1963; Valvo, 1971; Fine et al., 2003). These results appear 
to suggest that visual parsing might be subject to a critical period in the first few years of life. 
Despite the lack of conclusive evidence for the permanence of deprivation-induced deficits, 
individuals who have been blind past the age of 5 or 6 years but have treatable conditions (a 
situation virtually non-existent in developed nations, but which unfortunately is not as rare in the 
developing world) are often passed over for treatment owing to the assumed poor prognosis for 
recovery. 
It is worth noting that working with a non-infant population provides us with both advantages and 
disadvantages. On the one hand, since the brain is otherwise almost fully mature, visual learning 
can be segregated from development of the other senses and from real-world knowledge. On the 
other hand, a mature brain may not undergo the same progression as an infant brain. Thus, it is 
more appropriate to consider this work as complementary to, rather than a replacement for, 
traditional studies with infants.  
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Figure 3.1 Natural images, such as the one shown in (a) are collections of many regions of different hues and luminances, as 
indicated in (b). The human visual system has to accomplish the task of integrating subsets of these regions into coherent 
objects, as in (c). 
 
3.2 Methods 
 
Participants:  
SK is a 29 year old male, born in Bihar, India. By the time SK was 4 months old, members of his 
family noticed his inability to fixate and a lack of visually guided behaviors. Due to financial and 
logistical constraints, medical intervention was not sought until SK was an adolescent. At the age of 
12 years, SK was examined by an ophthalmologist, who recommended surgery to correct his sight. 
However, the operation was cancelled due to SK’s father’s illness, which completely depleted his 
family’s finances. SK was admitted to the State School for the Blind in Darbangha, Bihar, where he 
studied for 12 years and learned Braille. In 2000, he moved to a hostel for the blind in New Delhi 
and enrolled in a correspondence course, which earned him a master’s degree in political science in 
April, 2006. It was during a visit to this hostel that the authors met SK in January, 2004.   
Examinations by three independent ophthalmologists in New Delhi yielded identical assessments – 
SK has secondary congenital bilateral aphakia (Pratt and Richards, 1968; Johnson and Cheng, 
1997), with the lenses almost completely absorbed in the anterior and posterior chambers of the 
right and left eye respectively. The optical pathways in the eyes are clear. SK’s acuity was assessed 
to be 20/900. He had never been able to afford a pair of eye-glasses that could compensate for his 
aphakia. During our next visit to India, in July, 2004, we had SK re-examined by optometrists and 
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ophthalmologists in New Delhi and purchased a pair of eyeglasses for him. Post-correction acuity 
was determined to be 20/120. The residual acuity impairment is likely due to neural amblyopia 
(Kiorpes and McKee, 1999). 
Beginning two weeks after the refractive correction, we performed a series of experiments to 
assess SK’s visual abilities. Tests of low-level visual function revealed SK’s near-normal ability to 
discriminate between colors, luminances and motion directions.  
In addition to SK, we also had the opportunity to work with two male children, PB and JA, whom we 
studied 1 month and 3 months after surgery, respectively, to correct their dense bilateral congenital 
cataracts. PB received treatment at the age of 7 years and JA at the age of 13 years.  PB was born in 
a village near Panipat, Haryana. His family has a long history of congenital blindness. Both PB and 
his elder sister TB (age 12) were congenitally blind, as were his father, paternal grandmother, 
great-grandmother, two aunts, and an uncle. PB has been enrolled in the Blind Relief Association’s 
school in Delhi since the age of 4½ years. The parents did not pursue treatment for PB and TB 
because a doctor incorrectly pronounced TB’s condition to be untreatable due to the development 
of nystagmus. A botched eye surgery that PB’s uncle had undergone a few years earlier further 
dampened the parents’ desire to seek treatment for PB and TB. We came across PB in an outreach 
eye screening session we had organized in his school. His condition (congenital bilateral cataracts) 
was determined to be treatable. In December 2005, PB underwent a small-incision cataract surgery 
with intra-ocular lens implantation in both eyes, improving his acuity from light-perception to 
20/100. 
JA was born in Bijnor, Uttar Pradesh. He has five siblings, three sighted (ages 21, 19, and 8) and two 
congenitally blind (ages 17 and 7). Both parents are illiterate, and JA has never received any 
education. JA received cataract surgery and an intraocular lens implant at the Shroff Charity Eye 
Hospital in both eyes (Right Eye: September, 2005; Left Eye: October, 2005) to treat his dense 
bilateral congenital cataracts, resulting in an improvement in his acuity from light-perception to 
20/80. 
In what follows, we describe results from all three individuals. Practical constraints allowed us to 
work with SK more thoroughly than with PB and JA, preventing us from replicating every 
experiment from the battery with the children. A few of the following results graphs, therefore, 
show only SK’s data. For convenience, we shall refer to SK, JA and PB collectively as the ‘Recently 
Treated’ group. 
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SK volunteered his participation and was not paid, other than being compensated for 
transportation costs. The families of PB and JA were compensated for their expenses. Subjects were 
free to take as many rest breaks as they wished during the course of the testing. We also enlisted 
four normally sighted adult control subjects. These subjects came from a similar social tier as our 
experimental group and had received a basic education through high school. 
 
Procedures: 
Our visual parsing studies comprised seven experiments, which assessed the subjects’ responses 
with images of simple shapes. Their task was to say how many objects there were in each of the 
images, point to where they were, and whenever possible, name them. (All subjects were already 
familiar with common shape names through touch.) Figure 3.2(a) shows the specific tasks and 
representative stimuli corresponding to these experiments. Each of the conditions in the 
experiments to probe integration skills comprised 10 distinct trials. The recently-treated subjects’ 
viewing distance averaged 40 cm. Control subjects’ viewing distance was scaled to simulate image 
information loss due to the reduced acuity of the recently-treated group. All stimuli were presented 
until a response was given.  
 
3.3 Results 
The graph in Figure 3.2(b) shows the recently-treated subjects’ performance on these tasks relative 
to that of the control subjects.  Their responses on this experimental battery exhibited a consistent 
pattern. They had no difficulty in enumerating individual geometric shapes when presented by 
themselves, or even in the presence of other shapes, so long as they were non-overlapping 
(experiment ‘A’). However, with overlapped figures, presented either as line-drawings or as filled 
transparent surfaces (experiments ‘B’ and ‘C’), the recently-treated subjects’ responses were very 
different from controls’. They perceived all closed loops and regions of uniform luminance as 
distinct objects. All errors we observed were such errors of ‘over-fragmentation’. Thus, for instance, 
when viewing two overlapping squares, the recently treated subjects would invariably parse it as 
three objects. Using lines of different colors or luminances as potential aids to segmenting the 
component objects did not change this pattern of results. To ensure that the subjects understood 
the task, we had told them at the start of the experiment that figures may be overlapped (a notion 
61 
 
they were familiar with from prior haptic experience) and that they had to indicate the number of 
‘objects’ rather than ‘regions’.  
With opaque overlapping shapes (experiment ‘D’), SK was able to correctly indicate the number, 
but was at chance at determining their depth-ordering (experiment ‘E’). Extended contours made 
up of a series of separated line segments, embedded in a field of randomly oriented ones 
(experiment ‘F’) were only infrequently detected by the recently-treated subjects. In images of 
three-dimensional shapes, such as cubes or pyramids (experiment ‘G’), with surfaces of different 
luminance consistent with lighting and shadows, the recently-treated subjects reported perceiving 
multiple objects, one corresponding to each facet. They were unable to integrate the facets into the 
percept of a single 3-D object.  
In summary, the recently-treated subjects’ performance with this stimulus set indicated a profound 
inability to use cues of contour continuation, junction structure and figural symmetry to analyze the 
images presented. The subjects’ tendency to perceive the aforementioned stimuli in a fragmented 
manner was also reflected in their tracings of simple figures. Figure 3.2(c) shows a tracing by SK (in 
red) over a drawing by one of the authors. 
Next we investigated the functional significance of the recently-treated subjects’ atypical image 
parsing skills. Given their pronounced tendency to over-fragment images, we reasoned that their 
ability to veridically segment and recognize real-world images would be compromised. To test this 
hypothesis, we assessed their naming performance on a set of 50 images of common objects. SK 
was able to recognize only 26% of all images shown to him, JA recognized 34% and PB only 18%. 
We asked subjects to point to objects in these images and also to indicate their extent, even if they 
could not name the objects. We found that their responses were driven by low-level image 
attributes; they pointed to regions of different hues and luminances as distinct objects. This 
approach greatly over-segmented the scenes and partitioned them into meaningless regions, which 
are unstable across different views and uninformative regarding object identity. A robust object 
representation is difficult to construct based on such fragments. Figure 3.2(d), which shows SK’s 
responses on three sample images, illustrates this tendency towards over-fragmentation. In 
separate computational simulations, we have found that the subjects’ parsing can be largely 
accounted for by a simple computational algorithm of luminance and hue-based segmentation 
(Figure 3.2(d), lower row).  
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Figure 3.2 Subjects’ parsing of static images. Seven tasks (a) were used to assess the recently treated subjects’ ability to 
perform simple image segmentation and shape analysis. The graph (b) shows the performance of these subjects relative to 
the control subjects on these tasks. “NA” indicates that data are not available for a subject. S.K.’s tracing of a pattern drawn 
by one of the authors (c) illustrates the fragmented percepts of the recently treated subjects. In the upper row of (d), the 
outlines indicate the regions of real-world images that S.K. saw as distinct objects soon after sight recovery. He was unable 
to recognize any of these images. For comparison, the lower row of (d) shows the segmentation of the same images 
according to a simple algorithm that agglomerated spatially adjacent regions that satisfied a threshold criterion of similarity 
in their hue and luminance attributes.   
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So far, we have described the recently-treated subjects’ performance exclusively with static 
imagery. In order to make our experiments more representative of everyday visual experience, 
which typically involves dynamic inputs, we created a new set of stimuli that incorporated motion 
cues (Figure 3.3). The recently-treated subjects’ task here was the same as before – to indicate the 
number of objects shown. The individual shapes underwent independent smooth translational 
motion. For overlapping figures, the extent of movement was such as to maintain an overlap at all 
times.  
The inclusion of motion brought about a dramatic change in the recently-treated subjects’ 
responses. As data in Figure 3.3 indicate, they were able to produce correct responses for a majority 
of the dynamic stimuli. Motion also allowed SK to perceive shapes embedded in noise, a task that he 
was entirely unable to do in the static condition. Motion thus appears to be instrumental for 
enabling the subjects to link together parts of an object, and segregate them from the background. 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Motility ratings of the 50 images used to test object recognition and the recently treated subjects’ ability to 
recognize these images. Motility ratings were obtained from 5 normally sighted respondents who were naive as to the 
purpose of the experiment; the height of the black bar below each object indicates that object’s average rating on a scale 
from 1 (very unlikely to be seen in motion) to 5 (very likely to be seen in motion). The circles indicate correct recognition 
responses.   
 
The recently-treated subjects’ recognition results with real-world images, alluded to above, provide 
evidence of another role that motion might play in their object perception skills. In examining 
which images the recently-treated subjects were able to recognize, an interesting pattern became 
evident. As shown in Figure 3.4, the recently-treated subjects’ recognition responses show a 
significant congruence with independently derived motility ratings of objects shown in the images 
(p < 0.01; χ2 test for each of the three subjects). A plausible, though not definitive, explanation of the 
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congruence between the recently-treated subjects’ responses and ratings of motility, is that motion 
of objects helps bind their constituent regions into cohesive representations, which can then be 
used to recognize instances in new inputs that may well be static. It appears, however, that motion 
information is not used to the exclusion of figural cues, since preliminary tests with point-light 
walkers of the kind devised by Johansson (1973) proved ineffective for conveying the impression of 
a person. None of the three subjects in the recently treated group was able to perceive such displays 
as anything other than a collection of moving dots.  
 
 
3.4 Recently treated and control subjects’ performance on tasks designed to assess the role of dynamic information in object 
segregation. “NA” indicates that data are not available for a subject.  In the illustrations of the four tasks, the arrows indicate 
the path of movement.   
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We examined changes in the recently-treated subjects’ performance as a function of time after 
treatment. SK’s performance pattern was unaltered when we tested him 6 and 12 months after 
treatment. Given the relatively mature age at which he had received treatment, we were not hopeful 
of observing much visual recovery. However, the follow-up tests we conducted at 18 months post-
treatment demonstrated that SK’s visual skills, while still not normal, had registered a significant 
improvement. The results are summarized in Figure 3.5. Essentially, where SK previously required 
motion cues to integrate regions into objects, he could now perform the same tasks in static images. 
As Figure 3.4 shows, PB and JA too exhibited a similar improvement in their ability to parse static 
images as SK, when tested several months after initial treatment (10 months for PB and 12 months 
for JA).  
 
 
3.5 The recently treated subjects’ performance on four tasks with static displays soon after treatment and at follow-up 
testing after the passage of several months (indicated in the key).   
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3.4 Discussion 
 
Taken together, these results provide us a longitudinal glimpse into the development of visual 
parsing skills later in life. They suggest that the early stages of this process are characterized by 
integrative impairments. These impairments lead to perceptual over-fragmentation of images, and 
thus compromise recognition performance. However, the use of motion information effectively 
mitigates the integrative difficulties. During the early stages of visual learning, motion appears to be 
instrumental both in segregating objects and also in binding their constituents into representations 
for recognition.  
We derive confidence in the generality of the results described here based on the consistency 
between the three subjects, and also their congruence with findings from previously reported case-
studies of sight-recovery. While the earlier papers on sight recovery in adulthood (Gregory and 
Wallace, 1963; Fine et al., 2003) do not specifically focus on the individuals’ region integration 
skills, they report difficulties consistent with impairments in these skills during natural image 
recognition (for instance, Gregory and Wallace (1963, page 24), in describing their patient SB, 
wrote: “We formed the impression that he [SB] saw [the natural scenes as] little more than patches 
of colour.”) and in simple image parsing (Fine et al., in their report on MM (2003, page 915) wrote: 
“[MM] described two overlapping transparent squares as three surfaces with the central square in 
front.”). Furthermore, in these past cases, as in the present one, motion sensitivity was evident soon 
after treatment. 
The privileged status of motion observed with our recently-treated individuals is reminiscent of 
results reported in the infant literature. Although infants eventually come to be able to use static 
figural cues for object segregation (Needham, 1998, 1999), segmentation from motion arises at 
least two months prior to the ability to segment from static cues (Arterberry and Yonas, 2000; 
Johnson, 2003), and their ability to link spatially separated parts of a partially occluded object is 
initially driven strongly by common motion (Kellman and Spelke, 1983; Johnson et al., 2002). It is 
interesting to find this point of overlap between two developmental progressions that are 
separated by several years, given that maturational processes of the older group would presumably 
have already completed their time course. The neural underpinnings of this similarity are unclear. 
Its perceptual utility, however, admits a conjecture. It is possible that the early availability of 
motion sensitivity in the primate brain (Kiorpes and Movshon, 2003, 2004) serves an adaptive 
purpose by providing a scaffolding for acquiring static figural analysis skills. By observing the 
67 
 
correlations between motion-based groupings and static cues, such as aligned contours, the visual 
system might learn to use the latter by themselves as proxies for grouping (Cavanagh, 1993). This 
conjecture regarding potential dependencies between early and later developing visual skills has 
significant implications for theoretical models of visual learning (Sinha et al., in press). 
Our experimental results complement past studies of visual development in infancy and after sight 
restoration. First, they provide evidence that region integration via figural cues is unlikely to be 
merely a maturational process, unfolding with age, but rather a visually driven developmental one. 
Second, they highlight the limited grouping efficacy of static figural cues, such as spatially 
contiguous collinear contours, early in the visual-learning timeline. These cues have conventionally 
been assumed to be of fundamental significance for spatial integration (Wertheimer, 1938; Ullman, 
1996; Sigman et al., 2001). Third, the results provide evidence that motion cues might facilitate the 
building of linked assemblies of regions that can serve as representations for recognition in new 
inputs. In this way, they serve to connect basic grouping phenomena to real-world object 
recognition. Overall, these results suggest that dynamic information provides a key organizing 
influence for early visual processing.  
The evidence of marked improvement in our subjects' performance over the course of several 
months suggests that visual skills related to the complex task of image parsing can be acquired even 
after a prolonged delay, although the rate of acquisition slows down with age, possibly due to 
decreases in plasticity. Furthermore, the subjects’ visual experience during this period derived from 
their normal daily activities; no special training was provided. Indeed SK resided at a hostel for the 
blind with no sighted residents to provide instruction. These results, along with a case we have 
reported previously (Ostrovsky et al., 2006), argue for a tempering of the strict critical-period idea, 
and provide cause for optimism for the many blind individuals who are candidates for treatment. 
The human brain, it appears, retains at least some measure of its ability to launch programs of 
visual learning even after extended periods of visual deprivation. Furthermore, the insights into the 
progression of visual skill acquisition gathered from these studies point to possible rehabilitative 
programs for the often overlooked patients with congenital sight deprivation.  
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Chapter 4. An argument for Dynamic 
Bootstrapping as a theory of visual 
development 
Combining the insights we gain from our late-onset vision subjects and the evidence from existing 
infant studies, we outline here a candidate theory of the development of object-level visual 
segmentation.  
4.1 Introduction 
When a human adult with normal vision looks upon Figure 4.1, three novel objects upon a textured 
background are readily apparent. The visual system is able to perceive the boundary between each 
object and its background based on a variety of cues, including changes in color, texture and 
luminance, as well as the continuity of the subtle borders created by these changes. It is important 
to notice that these are novel objects, thus we must rely largely on general, “low-level” cues to 
accomplish the task of segmenting these novel objects from their novel background, rather than 
higher level knowledge gained from experience with these particular objects. 
 
Figure 4.1 A static "scene" that is easily parsed by a casual observer into three novel objects and a textured background. 
Cues that may enable this parsing include differences in luminance, color and texture as well as the continuity of edges 
formed by these cues. Cues such as these, commonly referred to as “Gestalt” laws or rules, seem important for the 
decomposition of the visual world into relevant parts, objects, and backgrounds. Are the processes which enable this parsing 
endowed through evolution, or are they sculpted through experience with the natural world? 
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The ease with which a normal observer can accomplish this task stands in marked contrast to the 
difficulties which newly sighted individuals (both infants and late-onset vision patients) encounter, 
as discussed in previous chapters. Clearly, at least some of these abilities develop over time. In this 
chapter we argue that this progression of the visual system is not simple maturation of innate 
visual skills, but rather a consequence of learning from the visual environment. 
4.1.1 The Historical Perspective 
No serious researcher would disagree that the “visual brain” is plastic and that the representations 
of objects, faces, scenes and textures are shaped to some degree through visual experience. The 
literature on perceptual learning is vast. A few prominent examples are shown in Figure 4.2. These 
findings are an example of long term or permanent changes to the visual system brought about by 
repeated exposure (or, in some cases, just one exposure) to these displays. An even more obvious 
example of this phenomenon might be the quotidian act of object or face recognition – the more one 
is exposed to an individual’s face, for instance, the quicker and more reliably that individual can be 
identified.  
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(A)           (B)  
 
 
(C)   
 
Figure 4.2 (A) Dalmatian dog illusion (Gregory, 1970) (photo taken from (Rubin, Nakayama, & Shapley, 1997)). Although 
perceptual organization of this scene is very difficult upon first sight of this image, the embedded dog is instantly recognized 
on subsequent viewings once the dog is identified to the observer just once. (B) Perceptual learning accounts for increased 
performance for tasks such as detection of changes in motion ((Ball & Sekuler, 1987); this image and review of similar tasks 
of perceptual learning in (Fine & Jacobs, 2002)). (C) The McCollough effect. After only a short viewing of the colored oriented 
bars on the right, a color after-effect is observed in the squares on the left, even after 2,040 hours between initial 
presentation and test (Jones & Holding, 1975). 
Such learning is not particularly controversial. Our primary concern here, however, is not the 
representation of object instances (which are clearly experience dependent) or the ability to 
become more skilled at a particular task, but rather the fundamental development of the “rules” or 
“heuristics” which parse any given scene – novel or familiar – into its constituents. These rules can 
be thought of as the elements of perceptual organization. The mere existence of perceptual learning 
suggests that it may be possible for perceptual organization principles to be learned or at least 
modified, but this question has raised considerable controversy throughout the history of vision 
science. 
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4.1.1.1 The Gestaltists 
The Gestalt “laws” of perceptual organization (Koffka, 1935; Wertheimer, 1923) identify a number of 
important grouping principles that have scaffolded modern perceptual theory. These principles, 
illustrated in Figure 4.3, include proximity (A), similarity of color (B), similarity of size (C), common 
fate (D), good continuation (E), and closure (F) (Palmer, 1999). Given processes to compute 
heuristics such as these, a visual scene can theoretically be decomposed into objects or object sets. 
The goal of the Gestaltist philosophy is to identify the complete set of such principles which 
underlie all of visual perception. 
 
Figure 4.3 The Gestalt principles of perceptual grouping. Image from (Palmer, 1999). 
 
The Gestaltist view seems to suggest a nativist position regarding the provenance of these 
perceptual building blocks; that is, the infant brain is born with these capabilities, and it is the job of 
the vision scientist to merely discover the processes endowed by evolution. This is in contrast to 
the empiricist position, wherein experience with the visual world guides the formation of these 
processes. Gordan and Slater (1999) note that Wolfgang Köhler, one of the founders of Gestalt 
psychology in the earliest decades of the 20th century, took the extreme nativist view. The debate 
hardly abated several decades later when Kanizsa (1979) wrote that “neither of the two theses 
[nativist versus empiricist] has clearly prevailed over the other, and the situation is still far from 
clear” (p. 25). His bias, however, seems toward the nativist view, as he outlines a series of 
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phenomena and diplomatically concludes that “the results of these experimental situations do not 
seem to be compatible with an extreme empiricist explanation of perceptual organization” (p. 27).  
4.1.1.2 Recent developments 
Although the Gestaltists made great strides in understanding the underlying “rules” of visual 
perceptual organization, it was the subsequent studies with infants which arguably provided the 
first significant empirical evidence attempting to resolve the nativist versus empiricist question in 
visual perception. Research with normal adults can serve to identify the basic properties of visual 
perception but not whether the processes which identify those properties are innate or acquired 
through experience. Uncovering what visual abilities are present at or near birth, however, can give 
us much greater insight into the debate. 
One of the earliest and most important set of experiments in this domain was performed by 
Kellman and Spelke (1983). These researchers found that common fate motion, one of the principles 
in the Gestalt framework, was highly effective at grouping the visually segregated parts of an 
occluded object in 4-month old infants (Figure 4.4). Later studies found similar results in even 
younger infants (2 month olds) (Johnson & Aslin, 1995). The very young age at which this ability 
presented itself suggested an innate ability, and Spelke (1990) hypothesized that infants make use of 
innate processes to create object models based on motion and surface segmentation properties; 
these models, in turn, provide the basis for learning other Gestalt grouping cues, such as symmetry 
and regularity—cues which infants did not reliably employ.  
 
Figure 4.4 Infants observe a "rod" occluded by a box in its center (A). When the rod undergoes translational motion while 
"behind" the box, infants perceived the rod as unbroken, as tested in a novelty looking preference test (B versus C) following 
habituation. Without motion, 2-4 month old infants perceive the rod as two individual pieces. Image from (Johnson & Aslin, 
1995). 
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Subsequent studies, however, suggested a more complex interpretation. The ability to perceive 
object unity in displays such as Figure 4.4(A) without motion did not develop until 6.5 months of 
age and the ability to interpolate the missing portion of the rod correctly was not evident until 8 
months (Craton, 1996). Were these abilities merely slower to mature in the infant brain than the 
ability to process common fate motion (but still innate)? Or does the visual system learn these 
abilities through experience with the visual world? It is difficult to discern between these two 
possibilities by studying normal infants, as the infant brain is maturing and learning 
simultaneously. Hence, we turn our attention to the findings of our work in Project Prakash. 
4.2 Motivation towards an empiricist theory of visual development 
Several findings described in earlier chapters have important implications for any theory of the 
development of visual parsing.  
Firstly, the case study of subject SRD shows that after 12 years of visual deprivation from birth, 
functional vision is largely undeveloped, yet after 20 years of visual experience, visual function 
becomes almost fully developed. A pure nativist theory of visual development would predict either 
(1) a critical period of maturation, after which vision would no longer develop under any 
circumstances, or (2) the near-immediate onset of visual function after recovery of optical function, 
due to the maturation of visual function along with other neurological function. Neither of these 
predictions matches the observed behavior of SRD. An alternative nativist explanation, in light of 
these facts, is that visual function is innate and comes about through brain maturation normally, yet 
the brain, being resilient, can acquire visual function through experience by utilizing alternative 
strategies. Although in principle this is a possible explanation, it seems unusual and wasteful that 
an ability which can demonstrably be learned (and learned quite well) is instead given a privileged 
innate module, which itself takes at least 8 months to develop in the normal infant, based on the 
evidence from the previous section.  
Secondly, our studies with Project Prakash patients immediately following sight onset demonstrate 
the lack of processes capable of perceptual organization in any but the most uncluttered, pre-
segmented scenes, with the notable and important exception of common motion grouping. 
Moreover, our longitudinal studies of these same subjects reveal that more advanced processes are 
indeed acquired after visual experience (with significant increase in function after approximately 
one year). This pattern matches the ordinal time course of infants—common fate motion grouping 
followed by grouping via static surface features, yielding some evidence against the notion that 
experience after a “critical period” leads to a parallel and different visual system. 
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Finally, studies with adolescents and adults, as opposed to infants, allow us to discount the 
influence of cognitive knowledge about the physics of the world, which feature in some theories of 
visual development (e.g., Spelke (1990)). Our subjects have fully developed knowledge about their 
physical world through their haptic experiences, as well as their formal education, yet this 
knowledge does not significantly inform their visual interpretations. 
These findings motivate a theory of visual development which focuses on the extraction of Gestalt-
like heuristics via learning based on visual experience.  
4.3 The Dynamic Bootstrapping hypothesis: The development of visual 
perceptual organization abilities through dynamic information 
Our findings suggest a general framework to describe how a newly-sighted individual progresses 
from an overly fragmented world of bits and pieces to a world of cohesive objects. The foundation 
of our theory is the somewhat counter-intuitive notion that dynamic information bootstraps static 
perceptual organization. In other words, the information that a visual system receives from objects 
in motion “teach” the cues that can be used to process static scenes. 
The framework is as follows: 
1. The principle of common fate motion as a grouping cue is learned very quickly through 
simple, local Hebbian learning or a similar process. This learning may be driven by the 
presence of simultaneous change in fragments belonging to objects that are moving, to 
which the brain is particularly sensitive. Alternatively, we may take the common fate 
motion principle as one of the few innate processes without fundamentally altering the rest 
of the framework. 
2. Object fragments are grouped together early in development into “proto-objects” via 
common fate motion cues. These proto-objects serve as the “ground truth” for the visual 
system’s notion of objectness.  
3. Given a “signal” that certain parts should bind together in the form of these proto-objects 
(and also a negative signal that certain parts do not bind together, when object parts belong 
to two separate proto-objects, for instance), the visual system can extract static regularities 
(i.e., regularities in image characteristics not dependent on motion) and, critically, associate 
these regularities with object cohesion. 
4. These static regularities can eventually be used to process a scene without dependence on 
motion cues. 
This “Dynamic Bootstrapping” hypothesis aims to describe the development of Gestalt-like 
perceptual organization cues via learning from the visual environment with the notion that one set 
of learned processes can bootstrap the next, with motion processing as the foundation of the 
development of visual object concepts. 
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It should be noted that Prodöhl and colleagues (2003) have recently proposed a similar hierarchical 
framework for the learning of Gestalt rules, but heretofore there has been a lack of evidence as to 
its viability. It is our hope that the work in this thesis serves to encourage the acceptance of this 
model and to provide empirical direction to further research. Furthermore, although the 
aforementioned model characterizes the learned cues as methods for segmenting objects from the 
background, we emphasize here the role of defragmentation – the process of combining objects 
parts and surface fragments into a whole. Admittedly, these goals are often complementary, but our 
experience with Project Prakash patients suggests greater deficits in oversegmenting the surface of 
an object than in determining the boundary between object and background. For instance, when 
asked to identify the object(s) in a scene depicting a cow in a pasture, subject SK correctly identified 
the black-and-white patches of the cow, but individually as separate objects (though a few dark cast 
shadows also confused him). He did not identify the background grass and sky as a myriad of 
individual objects. These distinctions warrant further investigation and are not taken up here. 
 
Figure 4.5 The Dynamic Bootstrapping hypothesis. A framework for how the visual system may learn perceptual organization 
cues by starting with just a few simple heuristics. 
4.4 Evidence for the Dynamic Bootstrapping hypothesis 
The Dynamic Bootstrapping hypothesis states that motion processing provides an “interpretation” 
of a scene which is used to learn static processes that can subsequently be used independently. 
Although we cannot observe this learning process directly, we examine here indirect evidence and 
arguments which lend credence to this hypothesis.  
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4.4.1 Empirical/developmental evidence 
A key requirement of the hypothesis is that motion processing abilities be available early in the 
developmental timeline. As summarized below, this requirement seems to be met in human 
development. 
A newborn infant, 1-3 days old, exhibits smooth pursuit eye movements in response to moving 
stimuli (Kremenitzer, Vaughan, Kurtzberg, & Dowling, 1979). Optokinetic nystagmus (OKN) to pattern 
coherence develops early, exhibiting adult-like patterns of performance at 1 month of age with no 
noticeable improvement over the next two months (Manny & Fern, 1990).  
Global motion processing, as measured using looking times at random dot patterns, matures quite 
early in the infant, as compared to global form processing without motion (see Braddick, Atkinson, & 
Wattam-Bell, 2003 for review). Infants (and adults) show a stronger, more robust response to global 
motion coherence than to global form in visual event-related potentials (VERPs) (Oliver Braddick & 
Atkinson, 2007).Common motion is the first and dominant cue identified for object part grouping in 
infants, as evidenced in the long line of studies discussed in section 4.1.1.2 by Kellman, Spelke, 
Johnson, Aslin, and others based on the rod-and-frame tasks of Kellman and Spelke (1983). These 
findings primarily focus on the binding of an object partially obscured by an occluder, implying a 
role for motion in the 3D interpretation of a scene. Our own work, discussed earlier, with newly 
sighted adolescents and adults after long term, congenital visual deprivation (Ostrovsky, Meyers, 
Ganesh, Mathur, & Sinha, 2009) highlights an even more fundamental role of motion in binding 
fragments of an object that differ in texture even in the presence of a single surface. Furthermore, 
the ability of our subjects to use this cue at such an advanced age of sight onset confirms the 
resiliency of the motion cue— underscoring its importance. 
One prediction of the Dynamic Bootstrapping hypothesis is that congenital deficiency in motion 
processing (sometimes called akinetopsia) should result in profound impairment of visual function. 
Such cases are exceedingly rare, but at least one such case (Ahmed & Dutton, 1996), though largely 
anecdotal, does suggest such a dysfunction. For instance, a staircase appears to this child to be a 
confusing collection of lines. Such cases provide an opportunity to test directly the necessity of 
motion processing for learning other perceptual cues. Attempts to locate more such cases have so 
far been unsuccessful. 
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4.4.2 Ecological/statistical evidence 
A further requirement of the Dynamic Bootstrapping hypothesis is that the statistics of the visual 
world support the possibility that static grouping cues may be learned from motion cues. Although 
in principle this requires knowledge of the learning algorithm itself (which, of course, is unknown), 
it is highly suggestive if it can be shown that motion grouping cues co-occur with static grouping 
cues. In other words, if static grouping cues tend to occur alongside motion grouping cues (which 
we have already shown are efficacious early on in development), it is reasonable that some learning 
process would eventually learn these static cues as well.  
Indeed, our work has shown that at least one important Gestalt grouping cue – contour 
continuation – is much more readily learnable by making use of the motion signal (Ostrovsky, Wulff, 
& Sinha, 2007; Sinha, Balas, Ostrovsky, & Wulff, 2009), especially over longer distances. Others have 
shown, with biologically-inspired neural network models, that short-range collinearity and 
curvilinearity can be learned from local motion signals (Prodöhl et al., 2003). 
4.4.3 Logistical evidence 
Finally, we offer a logistical argument for the necessity of motion in our hierarchy. In the case of 
contour continuity, mentioned above, common fate motion provides a more robust statistical 
dataset than statistics based solely on collinear co-occurrence in static scenes. However, static 
statistics do provide some information that could conceivably lead to the learning of contour 
continuity (Sigman, Cecchi, Gilbert, & Magnasco, 2001), and thus the necessity of motion information 
is still in question.  
In light of this, we offer one example of a cue which seemingly cannot be learned in principle from 
the static information available to an infant or newly sighted individual. In Figure 4.6, the reader 
will find three similar images. Images (A) and (B) are consistent with a 3D-wireframe (Necker) 
cube interpretation, behind three rod-shaped occluders. Image (C), though highly similar, does not 
allow for such a perceptual interpretation. Now, suppose that the cube in (A) and (B) is completed 
due to the principle of contour continuity. If so, then the figure in (C) should be similarly completed, 
as the same contours of the cube exist in that image. Contour continuity on its own cannot be the 
appropriate explanation, at least for the figure in (B). The explanation likely involves the junction 
configuration at the intersection of the cube and its occluders. 
83 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Images (A) and (B) suggest a Necker cube (3D-wireframe cube) behind three rod-shaped occluders. Contour 
continuation could account for this effect. However, image (C) does not suggest a Necker cube, contrary to what a contour 
continuation explanation would predict. See text for why motion cues seem necessary in a learning-based account of this 
effect. (Images from Kanizsa (1979, pp. 7-8).) 
Now, the question remains: How is this junction cue learned through experience? If an object such 
as the cube were in motion behind the occluders in (B), the common fate motion cues would 
identify the appropriate contours of the cube to bind together in the presence of the co-occurring T-
junctions. If the occluding bars were to move instead of the cube, a similar learning would occur, 
but for the surface of the bars, rather than the cube. The junctions in (C), however, would not likely 
occur in any kind of physical scenario caused by occlusion. Thus, motion would likely send the 
(appropriate) signal that these object parts should not bind together into a whole. 
Without the benefit of motion, statistical learning seems nearly impossible in this scenario. The 
static display does not indicate to which surface the regions surrounding the junction belong. 
Although some sort of alignment of T-junction may be learned, this should result in the binding of 
all surfaces together. There is no cue to decouple the occluder from the cube. In principle, the cube 
may have a different texture from the occluder, allowing the pieces of the cube to bind, but evidence 
from infants and Project Prakash patients precludes the use of this cue in early vision. Motion 
seems the only usable cue to inform the learning of this set of principles. 
 
4.5 Discussion  
The mechanisms of the development of visual perception are crucial to the understanding of visual 
perception itself. Although vision scientists have identified many abstract “rules” of vision, a 
rigorous definition of how these rules are applied has so far eluded us. By studying the genesis of 
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these rules, we gain insights into their implementation. We also learn much about what can go 
wrong in development, providing knowledge that might lead to more effective therapies for 
conditions such as amblyopia, visual perception problems stemming from late-onset vision, visual 
abnormalities due to stroke, or even some of the lesser known perceptual problems of seemingly 
unrelated neurological disorders such as Williams Syndrome (Atkinson et al., 1997) and Autism 
Spectrum Disorder (Spencer et al., 2000). 
The debate over which aspects of visual processing are innate and which are learned is by no 
means answered here, but the body of evidence summarized in this chapter forwards two goals:  
1. By decoupling biological maturation of brain mechanisms from experiential learning, we 
can emphasize with some confidence the prominent role of learning in visual development. 
2. By combining evidence about (a) the developmental timeline of certain visual processes in 
both infants and late-onset vision patients and (b) the ecological statistics of visual 
information, we suggest a model which links the learning of static figural cues to (possibly 
innate) dynamic cues. 
Several aspects of our model remain to be described. For instance, is the ability to process dynamic 
cues innate or itself learned via a more fundamental process? Is there a hierarchy of perceptual 
organization cues, where one set of cues enables the learning of the next; or does motion play a 
privileged role as “teacher,” providing the direct basis for learning all perceptual organization cues? 
Current data do not suggest any particular answer to these important questions. Furthermore, does 
this model apply to all of vision – including the processing of texture, spatial relationships, faces – 
or is it limited to object segmentation and defragmentation? Again, current evidence provides no 
answer. 
To help clarify these open issues, it would be useful to study patients with motion processing 
deficits at various onsets throughout development (a rare scenario), or to debilitate motion 
processing in animals, either surgically or by limiting vision to static, 2-dimensional scenes. By 
manipulating access to the motion signal at various stages in visual development, we can determine 
the selective effects of motion at each stage of the conjectured hierarchy of perceptual cue 
acquisition.  
Further progress can be made with computational models of cue learning. As described here, some 
simulations already suggest that contour continuity is a cue which can be learned more quickly via 
common motion information than without relying on motion. Modeling the learning of other cues 
using the motion signal, correlational statistics, and static cues determined empirically to be earlier 
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in the hierarchy would help us determine the relative importance of each cue to the learning of the 
next.  
Dynamic Bootstrapping is a framework meant to guide the development of more refined models of 
perceptual cue acquisition, raising perhaps more questions than it answers, but providing concrete 
directions for further inquiry in the empirical and computational domains. 
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Chapter 5. Conclusion 
 
In these chapters, we have documented several cases of visual recovery after congenital blindness, 
with testing spanning from mere days to 20 years after treatment. Our prodigious battery of 
experiments and several stages of longitudinal follow-up constitute the most extensive study of its 
kind known to date. We have shown that it is possible, even after 12 years of visual deprivation, to 
have a near-normal recovery of high-level visual function, and we have confidence that this same 
level of achievement can be extended to our subject with 29 years of deprivation, owing to his 
continued improvement paralleling that of our younger subjects (albeit somewhat slower). 
Furthermore, we have discovered a few of the incremental stages through which visual 
development must pass, with insights into the repercussions to real-world object parsing. Finally, 
we compiled our discoveries with those from infant research to propose a theory of visual 
development based on learning from a bootstrapping process which creates proto-object 
representations from common motion binding. 
We conclude in this chapter with the implications of our findings for the notion of a “critical period” 
in visual development and the nature versus nurture debate. Lastly, we discuss the future 
directions inspired by this work. 
5.1 Thoughts on the critical period 
The notion of a critical period for visual development—a special age after which the visual system 
can no longer develop useful sight – has been the dominant thinking for some time. Based on our 
experiences in Project Prakash, clinicians in India, who come across many cases of childhood 
blindness, will recommend against treatment for children who were born blind and remained 
untreated past the age of 5 or 6. This thinking, which is also in line with rich-country practice, stems 
from the historical literature on late-life eye surgeries, which often report the inability to attain 
normal adult-level sight, and perhaps from their own few experiences of late-life treatment.  
Yet, this basis for clinical practice is misleading. In many cases in the literature, follow-up was 
inadequate. As we have seen, the development of vision – even in the normal infant! – can take 
many months or well over a year for an adult. Clinicians in India who have treated such cases likely 
did not have the time or opportunity to check on the progress of their patients. They would have 
seen a child who, after treatment, had little ability to use his vision, and likely little progress would 
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have been made on the few visits afterwards. If the child did acquire vision, there would be little 
incentive to return to the clinic or hospital1. The common belief that all of visual development is a 
product of brain maturation led most clinicians and many researchers to dismiss the possibility that 
recovery could take a significant amount of time. 
Another potentially misleading complication in the literature pertains to subject selection. Some 
subjects receiving late-life treatment for blindness such as MM (Fine et al., 2003) and a 34 year old 
Zambian man (Carlson, Hyvärinen, & Raninen, 1986) show little progress after treatment. Both 
subjects became blind after the age of 3, and thus are not cases of congenital blindness. Carlson and 
colleagues attempted their rehabilitation regimen, which was successful in the case of a 23 year old 
woman who lost her vision at less than a year old (Carlson & Hyvärinen, 1983), on the Zambian man 
but achieved no success in this case. They blamed the lack of progress on his apparent lack of 
motivation2, but MM (a co-author on the research report about his own case) by all accounts was 
highly motivated in his recovery. Moreover, lacking a control group, there is no evidence that the 23 
year old woman benefited directly from the rehabilitation regimen3, so rehabilitation was unlikely 
to be a factor. 
Paradoxically, subjects who had had significant early exposure to vision but were blinded later in 
childhood fared poorer than the congenitally blind subjects in our work and that of others. Although 
the number of cases is few, this pattern seems consistent. How is it that a child blinded at the age of 
3, and who at that age would have had a virtually complete visual system, would come to not only 
lose this ability as an adult but would be at a disadvantage compared to the adult who had no vision 
as a child? We speculate here on a possible explanation which may have its roots in a little-
understood result from prosopagnosia. 
                                                             
1 One of the notable exceptions to this was our subject SRD, whose continued visits to the dedicated eye doctors at 
Raghudeep Eye Clinic in Ahmedabad, India allowed for long-term monitoring of her progress. In her many years of 
visits, however, her case was never catalogued or published before now. 
2 Regrettably, the lack of progress in many late-life vision patients is often attributed to factors such as low 
motivation, stubbornness and even poor intelligence. This unfortunate attitude may likely be due to the prevailing 
wisdom that, if the individual’s acuity is adequate, vision should simply “happen.” We hope our work sheds light on 
why the patient has little control over their own progress. The learning that is required to make sense of the new 
information coming in through the eyes is, for the most part, cognitively impenetrable (i.e., beyond the level of 
conscious, cognitive control). 
3 The authors cite as evidence of rehabilitative efficacy the fact that the subject had no recovery of functional 
vision up to 9 months after treatment and that recovery began only during the 1.5 years of rehabilitation following 
this time. We saw a similar pattern in our subjects, however, who partook in no rehabilitation regimen. 
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Prosopagnosia (Bodamer, 1947) is a disorder characterized by a pronounced deficit in recognizing 
faces. Oddly, its patients can perform within-category object recognition, even when matched for 
difficulty (Farah, Levinson, & Klein, 1995). Why, then, can prosopagnosics not enroll their object-
specific recognition faculties to largely overcome their face-specific deficits? One possibility is that 
the use of a face-specific faculty is “mandatory”. This is borne out in the “inverted face inversion 
effect” (Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1995), where prosopagnosic subjects show an improvement 
in performance for upside-down faces compared to their right-side up counterparts, the inverse of 
the usual effect in normal subjects. It is thought that inverting a face disrupts normal facial 
processing, and in the case of prosopagnosics, this may lead to relatively better performance by 
enabling the usage of object-specific strategies which are intact.  
This phenomenon may also explain the apparent inability of patients such as MM and others to 
recover their previously available sight. Given many years of blindness, the substrate of cortex 
responsible for their high-level visual processes may have lost their function or been appropriated 
for other functions. If, however, the pathway to this substrate remained robust (perhaps due to 
spurious neuronal firing or to a consequence of anatomical connectivity), the usage of this “broken” 
substrate may be mandatory. Thus, as prosopagnosics are constrained to process faces as faces, not 
as objects, these late-vision patients must make use of a broken high-level visual system. 
Congenitally blind patients, however, may not have formed these robust pathways, and hence their 
newly forming visual system in adulthood may form elsewhere and become accessible via new 
pathways.  
Regardless of whether this theory of mandatory usage of a broken high-level vision substrate is 
correct, the distinction in the clinical outcome of late-life treatments for the congenitally blind 
versus individuals blinded in early childhood is an important one. The ramifications of this 
distinction are more than academic. Adult cases of sight (non-)recovery often lead to 
disappointment and depression, whereas our experiences with children, adolescents, and adults 
have been very positive, given adequate patience. This issue requires more direct study, but our 
tentative consideration is that cases of congenital blindness with good eye-health outcomes are 
appropriate candidates for treatment even into adulthood. On the other hand, cases of early-
childhood blindness with long-term visual deprivation should be considered with caution. A 
sufficiently brief period of deprivation in these patients would certainly allow for recovery, but we 
do not yet have any data points to determine this maximum duration.  
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5.2 Nature versus nurture 
We have seen that the development of many low-level visual processes is largely driven by a 
process of maturation endowed to humans and other animals by evolution. Anatomical and 
physiological evidence shows that the timeline of this development does not depend strongly on 
visual input, although degenerate conditions of visual stimulation can still affect vision outcomes. 
Behavioral evidence in long-term deprivation studies seems to indicate that the foundations of 
vision are present immediately in a mature subject, although not at optimum levels and assuming 
enough light stimulation to prevent physical atrophy.  
A different picture has emerged, however, for high-level vision. After sight onset following 
congenital deprivation, high-level vision takes a significant amount of time to develop. In contrast 
to low-level vision, this developmental process may not conform to a set maturational timeline. In 
the case of sight onset occurring in adulthood, visual development does not occur instantly, but 
rather progresses in stages as does infant visual development. There are broadly four theories to 
account for our observations of the development of high-level vision, and we consider each in turn: 
1. High-level vision is a product of maturation, endowed completely by evolution, and 
unfolding unconditionally according to a set timeline from birth. 
This viewpoint is untenable. If maturation were solely responsible for high-level vision, 
then visually deprived subjects would either have complete vision soon after recovery (due 
to the conclusion of the maturational process) or would never acquire vision, having passed 
the critical period requiring visual stimulation. Neither of these scenarios fits the evidence. 
2. High-level vision develops from visual experience. 
This is our preferred viewpoint. General perceptual learning occurs throughout life, and the 
cortex has been shown to be highly plastic. The timeline of acquisition, and its flexibility, is 
consistent with a learning explanation. However, the lack of high-level vision acquisition in 
non-congenital cases such as MM argues somewhat against this viewpoint. Further work 
needs to be done in order to determine whether our theory of pre-deprivation vision 
causing later-life complications (discussed above) is an adequate explanation for this 
inconsistency. 
3. High-level vision is a product of maturation, but maturation can be “paused” pending visual 
stimulation. 
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Although this theory is difficult to rule out, there is no evidence of which this author is 
aware to support the notion that a maturational program can remain latent for a minimum 
of 29 years (as in the case of SK). By contrast, a learning account such as the one mentioned 
above does not depend on unknown anatomical processes.  
4. High-level vision matures normally even in visually deprived individuals, but years of 
disuse can mask its functionality. Visual stimulation allows the visual system to re-
appropriate this previously unused substrate. 
This theory seems unlikely given cases such as MM. The usage which MM had of the high-
level visual “module” during his first 3.5 years, under this theory, would have made it more 
likely that he would have recovered normal vision compared to congenital blindness cases, 
which is contrary to reports.  
It is important to note, however, that our leaning towards a learning account of high-level vision is 
not meant to completely exclude any role of innate biases or processes; rather, the evidence points 
to learning as the mechanism which enables the visual system to progress from a rudimentary 
starting point to a highly functional ability. As a case in point, consider the recent studies of Sugita 
(2008), which found that infant monkeys deprived of facial stimuli from birth (but that nonetheless 
had normal visual experience) exhibited a high-level of discrimination abilities for both featural and 
configural differences in human and monkey facial stimuli. This may indicate that monkeys, at least, 
may have some innate facial recognition abilities, though this by no means would extrapolate to the 
object parsing abilities on which we focus our attention. It is also questionable whether this result 
applies to humans, as configural processing in particular is known to develop over many years in 
children (see discussion in Chapter 1), while Sugita found that it seems to peak at just 6 months of 
age in monkeys, with no discernible ramp-up period, at least in the ages tested. It is also difficult to 
determine whether the pattern of results witnessed by Sugita is “face processing” per se or an 
instance of general object recognition. These studies do show a pattern of perceptual narrowing 
(Pascalis, de Haan, & Nelson, 2002), akin to the “other race” effect (Cross, Cross, & Daly, 1971), to 
exposed human or monkey faces, dampening observed discriminability in the non-exposed 
category. This narrowing would indeed point to face-specific processes, but this effect was 
observed after one month of exposure to the respective face category (i.e., following visual 
experience with the appropriate category). Furthermore, this period of exposure was equally 
effective after 6, 12 and 24 months of facial deprivation, indicating perhaps a learning process 
somewhat independent of maturation (though it is also consistent with a delayed-maturation 
94 
 
account).  Regardless of whether some aspects of face processing may be innate, the development 
of these processes to maturity seems to involve a categorical shift after visual experience in 
individuals visually-deprived from birth. In face detection tasks, for instance, performance after 
little visual experience exhibits a pattern consistent with the performance of an image-matching 
algorithm, with false detections correlating with simple image-level similarity, while experience of 
6-18 months yields a clearly categorical effect consistent with a more sophisticated parsing of face-
specific representations (Meng, Cherian, & Sinha, 2009). Thus, visual experience may play a 
substantial role in the development of high-level vision processes, even if the rudiments of these 
processes are present soon after birth. 
Even if our studies do not resolve the larger nature vs. nurture debate in the domain of vision, our 
work chronicles the stages of high-level visual acquisition in greater detail than has been seen 
before. Although some stages of this acquisition have been observed in infants in the ground-
breaking work of Spelke and, later, Johnson and others (see introduction), the opportunity to take 
away the variables of general intelligence development and real-world knowledge has shed light on 
the purely perceptual aspects of vision. These insights have led us to propose a theory to bootstrap 
high-level visual learning based on the observed timeline in real-world acquisition. 
Our conclusions are still tempered by the caveat that visual acquisition in an older child may not be 
a wholly accurate representation of normal infant visual development. Hopefully, our observations 
here can serve as the groundwork for further work in infants and animals in order to confirm (or 
disprove) the general applicability of our findings. 
 
5.3 Future directions 
Our work on visual development lays only the foundation for a far more ambitious research 
program. If our conclusion that high-level visual development is a consequence of learning from the 
visual environment is true, a number of interesting research questions beg to be addressed. Here, 
we list a few of these directions. 
1. Identifying mechanisms for learning 
One key aspect of the learning process is the mechanism for binding one statistical regularity (e.g., 
continuous contours) to a known interpretation for another statistical regularity (e.g., the 
“objectness” of elements undergoing common motion). One principle which is worth exploring is 
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temporal synchronicity, or simultaneity.  Synchronicity seems instrumental in very rapidly altering 
proprioceptive mappings via touch and vision, such as with the rubber-hand illusion (Botvinick & 
Cohen, 1998) where synchronous haptic and visual input “remap” the perceived positioning of a 
subject’s hand onto an “alien” limb. Perhaps moments of sudden change in the visual domain serve 
as binding signals between elements undergoing change at the same time. Some of our work has 
pointed out the importance of such sudden “accelerations” for object binding (Ostrovsky, Leonova, & 
Sinha, 2008). Our work emphasizes the importance of motion information in learning, but signals for 
statistical learning in the static world are undoubtedly important as well.  
2. Discovering the timeline of other visual perceptual abilities 
Our work in Project Prakash has identified the developmental progress of a few Gestalt-like 
perceptual cues, as has the infant literature. As efforts proceed toward identifying a larger number 
of subjects and increasing their accessibility to the researchers, we will have the opportunity to 
probe the development of these and other cues on a finer timescale. The order in which the ability 
to utilize each of these cues develops would be useful for hypothesizing the dependence of one set 
of cues on another, though the order alone is not sufficient to prove this dependence. Experimental 
manipulations during within-session learning, if this is possible, may shed light on the question of 
causal dependence. 
3. Possibilities for manipulation of the course of visual learning 
If indeed many perceptual abilities are learned from the environment, it should in principle be 
possible to manipulate the acquisition of these abilities. This would be most useful for the late-
onset vision patients, whose progress in acquiring visual function initially is somewhat slow. 
Behavioral interventions may speed up the rate of functional acquisition by, perhaps, appropriately 
concentrating training on important defragmentation cues. This kind of intervention would have 
applicability to our patients in the developing world, but may also become important more 
generally as new technologies such as retinal implants (Rizzo et al., 2001) become common place. 
4. Expanding the scope of learning to other modalities 
In addition to object segmentation and defragmentation functions discussed here, the newly 
sighted individual must bind visual representations to haptic ones. William Molyneux (1688), in a 
letter to the philosopher John Locke, first expressed the problem: If an individual, blind from birth, 
were suddenly made to see, would that individual be able to distinguish a cube from a sphere 
(having touched both previously) by the use of sight alone?  
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As with the development of perceptual organization, this cross-modal recognition ability may also 
be either innate or learned. Prior work has pointed to the high level of plasticity in the cross-modal 
domain (Held, 1965; Held & Bossom, 1961), making this a rich domain for the exploration of learned 
mechanisms. 
We have probed the Molyneux question in our Project Prakash subjects, and the answer seems to 
be that the ability is not present immediately but is rapidly acquired over the course of weeks (in 
preparation). The mechanisms of this acquisition may shed light on how purely visual skills are 
acquired and vice versa. 
 
5.4 Postscript 
Since the work published in these chapters, we have had several more subjects, all showing similar 
signs of visual learning. BK is one such example. BK and his two brothers all suffered from 
congenital bilateral cataracts leading to a life of blindness. Years earlier, BK’s older brother had 
received treatment for his cataracts but, sadly, passed away after complications from infection at a 
less competent clinic than our partner hospital, making his parents understandably reticent to 
pursue treatment for their remaining two sons when we presented that opportunity. Nonetheless, 
eventually they decided to allow BK to go forth with the normally routine operation 
(phacoemulsification with an intraocular lens implant). 
Prior to his subsequent cataract surgery at the age of 16, BK was quiet, with seemingly poor self-
confidence. Soon after surgery, his demeanor did not much change, nor did his vision. Although his 
acuity had improved, his usage of that vision was minimal. Several months later, his performance 
remained the same. On one of our most recent visits, however, BK was a changed man. Suddenly, 
his performance on our tests was near perfect. He beamed a smile while telling stories of his 
shopping for food, by sight, on his own. His posture was upright, rather than sullen, and he seemed 
to have a new-found confidence. A few months after BK’s treatment, his younger brother received 
an operation as well. Now BK good-naturedly pokes fun at his brother’s inability to make sense of 
the shapes with which he himself had had so much trouble only months earlier. His brother, 
happily, seems well on his way to mimic BK’s progress. 
These cases have changed the policies at Shroff Charity Eye Hospital (Delhi, India), where we 
performed most of our tests. Whereas previously the doctors were hesitant to operate on patients 
past early childhood, they now routinely treat patients like BK, providing them with greater 
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opportunities in a socioeconomic reality where blindness is a far greater challenge than in the 
world of anyone reading this treatise. The opportunity to directly affect the lives of these 
individuals has been the largest benefit of my work with Project Prakash. 
It has been a privilege to collaborate with the tireless doctors at the various hospitals and clinics we 
have visited, most of which are charity endeavors. Their daily efforts help countless children (and 
adults) with limited prospects in life. It is a hope that our work can have a fraction of the impact 
that these organizations have had over many decades. My gratitude also goes out to our many 
subjects, who endured much boredom but also shared in many laughs during our incessant 
experimentation. Sadly, one of our subjects, SRD, had her life cut tragically short in a bus accident 
not long after we had met her. She had endured much in her personal life, yet her spirit was 
courageous, kind, and giving. She will never know the impact she has had outside of her world.
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